Cost-sharing strategy for recycling and service investment in a closed-loop supply chain

Shan, Renbang; Luo, Li; Kou, Ran

doi:10.1051/ro/2021143

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…In this case, the farmer adopts digital technology to plant agricultural products and the cost of digital investment is shared by the farmer and the platform, that is, the cost‐sharing contract is reached between the platform and the farmer. Cost‐sharing contracts are very common in practice (Shan et al, 2021; Wang et al, 2023). The cost‐sharing ratio of the platform is

λ

, and the remaining

\overset{λ}{true} = 1 - λ

is borne by the farmer.…”

Section: Model Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Digital technology adoption strategies for a contract farming supply chain under CVaR criterion

Liao,

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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This study considers a contract farming supply chain consisting of a platform and a risk‐averse farmer with yield uncertainty. It establishes game theory models with and without digital technology under CVaR criterion and analyzes three digital cooperation mechanisms. We find that when the wholesale price is moderate, both parties will choose a cost‐sharing contract; when the wholesale price is high, both parties will choose to let the farmer bear the cost of digital investment; when the farmer uses digital technology to grow agricultural products, the platform should not provide the farmer with a low wholesale price, especially for the farmer with low risk aversion.

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λ

, and the remaining

\overset{λ}{true} = 1 - λ

is borne by the farmer.…”

Section: Model Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Digital technology adoption strategies for a contract farming supply chain under CVaR criterion

Liao,

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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show abstract

“…There exists a wealth of research on supply chain coordination, which is mainly achieved through contracts. For instance, notable contract types include cost-sharing contracts (Xu et al [42]; Shan et al [31]), two-part tariff contracts (Moorthy [25]; Lambertini [17]), buyback contracts (Liu et al [21]), revenue sharing contracts (Cachon and Lariviere [5]; Mafakheri and Nasiri [24]; Panda et al [27]), and quantity discount contracts (Jeuland and Shugan [14]; Kolay et al [16]; Xiao and Qi [40]).…”

Section: Green Supply Chain Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Product pricing, green effort decisions and coordination in a dynamic three-echelon green supply chain

Wang,

Liu,

Wen

2024

JIMO

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The paper focuses on a three-echelon supply chain consisting of a green supplier, a green manufacturer and a retailer. Considering the dynamic changes in product greenness, differential games are employed to investigate product prices, green efforts and coordination in the system. By comparing equilibrium results in various scenarios, it is found that supply chain decisionmakers invest more in green efforts to maximize their profits under centralized decision, while they select pricing tools under decentralized decision. Importantly, when a local alliance composed of the supplier and manufacturer supplies products to the retailer at a flexible and dynamic wholesale price, the two-part tariff contract can fully coordinate the three-echelon green supply chain. The Rubinstein bargaining model is then used to optimize the profit allocation within the alliance. Additionally, the impact of green effort efficiency on decision-making is explored, revealing that green efforts depend on the efficiency of green efforts, while product pricing has nothing to do with the efficiency of efforts. The paper also points out that decentralization increases the probability of the supplier engaging in more green efforts than the manufacturer.

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“…Simultaneously, we introduced a replenishment cost-sharing contract led by the supplier between the supplier and the farmer to reduce the farmer's risk caused by uncertain yield. Some scholars considered the advertising cost, investment cost, and freshness-keeping cost sharing contract [9,12,[27][28][29]. Arani et al [30] introduced a novel mixed revenue-sharing option contract to coordinate a retailer manufacturer supply chain.…”

Section: Option Contracts and Cost-sharing Contractsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordinating a three-level contract farming supply chain with option contracts considering risk-averse farmer and retailer

Liao

Lin

2023

PLoS ONE

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We considered a three-level contract farming supply chain comprising a risk-averse farmer, a risk-neutral supplier, and a risk-averse retailer. The farmer plants and grows fresh agricultural products with yield uncertainty, the supplier is the leader of the supply chain and the designer of the contracts, and the retailer sells processed products with random demand. Under CVaR criterion, this paper discusses three option contracts between the supplier and the retailer, as well as wholesale price contracts or replenishment cost-sharing contracts between the supplier and the farmer. Results show that when the farmer is risk-neutral, option contracts with or without replenishment cost-sharing contracts can maximize the total profit and increase the profits of all members simultaneously. When the farmer and the retailer are risk-averse, only option contracts with replenishment cost-sharing contracts can ensure supply chain full coordination and Pareto improvement by adjusting the option parameters and making the farmer’s sharing ratio equal to his risk aversion coefficient. Moreover, through numerical analysis, we discovered that the interval of the Pareto improvement decreases with the retailer’s risk aversion coefficient and the quantity loss rate, and increases with the farmer’s risk aversion coefficient. The supplier will not be able to increase his own profits when the loss rate is excessively large. Therefore, the leader should consider the risk aversion degree of all parties and the quantity loss rate of fresh agricultural products before choosing contracts.

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Cost-sharing strategy for recycling and service investment in a closed-loop supply chain

Cited by 8 publications

References 56 publications

Digital technology adoption strategies for a contract farming supply chain under CVaR criterion

Digital technology adoption strategies for a contract farming supply chain under CVaR criterion

Product pricing, green effort decisions and coordination in a dynamic three-echelon green supply chain

Coordinating a three-level contract farming supply chain with option contracts considering risk-averse farmer and retailer

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