Costly reputation building still promotes the collective trust within the networked population

Xia, Chengyi; Hu, Zhengyang; Zhao, Dawei

doi:10.1088/1367-2630/ac8898

Cited by 20 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…Here, only l = 4 consecutively distributed nodes are pinned with b = 10.4. Table 3 compares the numerical values of the moments of C with the analytical predictions in (13). It shows that the analytical expectations of the moments are exactly the same as the numerical realizations.…”

Section: Globally Coupled Networkmentioning

confidence: 64%

Moment-based analysis of pinning synchronization in complex networks with sign inner-coupling configurations

Xiang

Liu

et al. 2023

Front. Phys.

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In this paper, pinning synchronization of complex networks with sign inner-coupling configurations is investigated from a moment-based analysis approach. First, two representative non-linear systems with varying dynamics parameters are presented to illustrate the bifurcation of the synchronized regions. The influence of sign inner-coupling configurations on network synchronizability is then studied in detail. It is found that adding negative parameters in the inner-coupling matrix can significantly enhance the network synchronizability. Furthermore, the eigenvalue distribution of the coupling and control matrix in the pinned network is estimated using the spectral moment analysis. Finally, numerical simulations are given for illustration.

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Section: Globally Coupled Networkmentioning

confidence: 64%

Moment-based analysis of pinning synchronization in complex networks with sign inner-coupling configurations

Xiang

Liu

et al. 2023

Front. Phys.

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“…In 2006, Nowak [21] outlined five mechanisms that promote the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, group selection, indirect reciprocity, direct reciprocity, and spatial reciprocity. Building on this foundation, numerous other mechanisms such as reputation [22][23][24][25][26][27][28], rewards and punishments [29][30][31][32][33][34],…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism promotes cooperation

Zhu,

Wang,

Wang

et al. 2024

New J. Phys.

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A good group reputation often facilitates more efficient synergistic teamwork in production activities. Here we translate this simple motivation into a reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism in the public goods game. Specifically, the reputation type of a group, either good or bad determined by a reputation threshold, modifies the nonlinear payoff structure described by a unified reputation impact factor. Results show that this reputation-based incentive mechanism could effectively promote cooperation compared with linear payoffs, despite the coexistence of synergy and discounting effects. Notably, the complicated interactions between reputation impact and reputation threshold result in a sharp phase transition from full cooperation to full defection. We also find that the presence of a few discounting groups could increase the average payoffs of cooperators, leading to an interesting phenomenon that when the reputation threshold is raised, the gap between the average payoffs of cooperators and defectors increases while the overall payoff decreases. We further extend our framework to heterogeneous situations and show how the variability of individuals affect the evolutionary outcomes. Our work provides important insights into facilitating cooperation in social groups.

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“…Evolutionary game theory offers a theoretical scaffold to probe the rise of cooperation, especially when kin selection is non-functional, as observed among genetically unrelated individuals [14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23]. In recent years, various theoretical models such as the prisoner's dilemma game, snowdrift game, stag hunt game and public goods game have been proposed to study the evolution of cooperation in real-world scenarios [24][25][26]. In addition to these models, the collective-risk social dilemma game, as a nonlinear public goods game, is gaining recognition due to its potential for application in climate change and migration [27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of conditional cooperation in collective-risk social dilemma with repeated group interactions

Hua,

Hui,

Liu

2023

Proc. R. Soc. B.

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The evolution and long-term sustenance of cooperation has consistently piqued scholarly interest across the disciplines of evolutionary biology and social sciences. Previous theoretical and experimental studies on collective risk social dilemma games have revealed that the risk of collective failure will affect the evolution of cooperation. In the real world, individuals usually adjust their decisions based on environmental factors such as risk intensity and cooperation level. However, it is still not well understood how such conditional behaviours affect the evolution of cooperation in repeated group interactions scenario from a theoretical perspective. Here, we construct an evolutionary game model with repeated interactions, in which defectors decide whether to cooperate in subsequent rounds of the game based on whether the risk exceeds their tolerance threshold and whether the number of cooperators exceeds the collective goal in the early rounds of the game. We find that the introduction of conditional cooperation strategy can effectively promote the emergence of cooperation, especially when the risk is low. In addition, the risk threshold significantly affects the evolutionary outcomes, with a high risk promoting the emergence of cooperation. Importantly, when the risk of failure to reach collective goals exceeds a certain threshold, the timely transition from a defective strategy to a cooperative strategy by conditional cooperators is beneficial for maintaining high-level cooperation.

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Costly reputation building still promotes the collective trust within the networked population

Cited by 20 publications

References 56 publications

Moment-based analysis of pinning synchronization in complex networks with sign inner-coupling configurations

Moment-based analysis of pinning synchronization in complex networks with sign inner-coupling configurations

Reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism promotes cooperation

Evolution of conditional cooperation in collective-risk social dilemma with repeated group interactions

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