Costly Signaling and China's Strategic Engagement in Arctic Regional Governance

Abstract

In recent years, China has become an increasingly important actor in Arctic regional governance. While Beijing consistently frames its engagement in the region as a strategy of mutually-beneficial cooperation, some Arctic countries have raised significant concerns about its growing economic presence, warning that China may leverage its geopolitical influence to change the existing norms and rules in the polar region. Facing the mounting “China threat” skepticism, what are Beijing’s coping strategies to belie concerns? Based on a review of the existing research and government documents, particularly Chinese-language scholarly works and official reports, this article specifically identifies two types of costly signaling approaches employed by China to reduce Arctic countries’ distrust. First, China has started to curtail its Arctic investment in oil, gas, and mining while engaging more in sectors that chime well with Western societies’ global environmental values, including clean and renewable energy, ecological research that addresses further climatic change associated with global warming, and other environmentally sustainable industries. Second, Beijing has increasingly involved in regional international organizations, such as the Arctic Council, to signal its willingness to exercise state power under institutional constraints. These approaches aim to send a series of costly signals to conventional Arctic states, reassuring them that China is not a revisionist power that pursues hegemony in the region. Taken together, our findings have both scholarly and policymaking implications to understand China’s participation in Arctic regional governance.

Arctic environmental governance: challenges of sustainable development

“…Doose, Poberezhskaya, and Beuerle point out that "it is important to continue engaging with Russia for the success of global efforts in climate mitigation and adaptation" (2023, p. 47). In line with these stud-11 For example, Oldfield (2018) ies, there is growing attention being paid to international environmental scientific collaboration in a newly divided world in the 21st century (e.g., Vladimirova 2023;Borozna 2024;Wang and Ma 2024;Doose 2022).…”

“…Given the increasing role of China in Russia's economy and politics, the climate stance of China may also play a role in maintaining climate issues on the agenda of the current Russian government. China demonstrates its stance on sustainable development via membership or via observer-status in multiple international organizations or forums, investing in renewable energy in Central Asia and actively participating in the Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM), Climate Vulnerable Forum, and the AC, among others (Agostinis and Urdinez 2022;Tosun and Shyrokykh 2022;Tosun and Mišić 2022;Davydova 2024;Wang 2023;Wang and Ma 2024). Tosun and Shyrokykh (2022), for example, demonstrate the efficiency of China's involvement and its leadership in the CEM, as compared to the passive role of Russia in the same organization.…”

“…In fact, according to some sources, indigenous people in Russia became some of the main targeted groups for military mobilization (seeLibman and Obydenkova 2023;Vladimirova 2024Vladimirova , 2023). 8 About China´s involvement in the Arctic, also seeWang and Ma (2024).…”