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“…Second, the 2009 Census statistics for labour migrants is not quite reliable. As Chubrik and Kazlou (2013) argue, census data might underestimate labour migration, given that (a) it was implemented in mid-autumn when the share of non seasonal workers is significant; (b) some labour migrants might not take part in the census because their work abroad was in progress; (c) some temporary migrants might not be working not because they did not have a job but because they were waiting for an answer from their employers or were preparing to start work. Indeed, census data show that another 46,900 workingaged Belarusians were waiting for the start of the working season, 31,200 awaited an answer from their .…”
Section: B Estimated Number Of Labour Migrantsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This may indicate the worsening quality of education, especially in case of correspondence students, and its poor matching to the labour market. Indeed, the quality of the educational system in Belarus is generally agreed to be questionable (see Chubrik and Kazlou, 2013).…”
Section: F Remittances and Human Capital Formationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet a significant number of Belarusian labour migrants areas are urban: as a rule, men maintain their families by working abroad. According to estimates based on the 2009 Census micro-data (Chubrik and Kazlou, 2013), rural areas' share in number labour migrants is lower than that in the total work force. Rural migrants comprise only 18.3% of working in Russia and 10.7% of labour migrants working in other countries.…”
Section: G Remittances Poverty and Income Inequalitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Wage differences between big Belarusian cities and Russia are less than those between small Belarusian towns or rural settlements and Russia, so labour migrants from bigger cities more often choose non-Russian destinations to get a higher salary. Chubrik and Kazlou (2013) are correct then when they argue that external labour migration in Belarus is more an urban than a rural phenomenon.…”
Section: G Remittances Poverty and Income Inequalitymentioning
The objective of the present paper is to evaluate the potential development impact and any possible side effects of remittances in Belarus. Our main finding, based on VAR modeling, is that we cannot consider remittances as a driver of economic growth in Belarus: their positive influence on GDP growth is not statistically significant. In fact, in the next period GDP responds negatively to remittances growth (p-value is 0.005). To some extent this may be a result of a productivity decrease conditioned by possible brain-drain effects and high employee turnover. Remittances appear to be strongly pro-cyclical with respect to Russian GDP and mildly procyclical with respect to the GDP of Belarus. Analysis shows that negative influence of remittances on GDP is not caused by Dutch disease and inflation: neither exchange rate appreciation nor growth in consumer price is induced by remittances. Instead, lagged REER devaluation Granger causes growth in remittances inflow (Wald test p-value is 0.051): when in a crisis devaluation takes place in Belarus more people go abroad to support their families and more transfers come from abroad.
“…Second, the 2009 Census statistics for labour migrants is not quite reliable. As Chubrik and Kazlou (2013) argue, census data might underestimate labour migration, given that (a) it was implemented in mid-autumn when the share of non seasonal workers is significant; (b) some labour migrants might not take part in the census because their work abroad was in progress; (c) some temporary migrants might not be working not because they did not have a job but because they were waiting for an answer from their employers or were preparing to start work. Indeed, census data show that another 46,900 workingaged Belarusians were waiting for the start of the working season, 31,200 awaited an answer from their .…”
Section: B Estimated Number Of Labour Migrantsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This may indicate the worsening quality of education, especially in case of correspondence students, and its poor matching to the labour market. Indeed, the quality of the educational system in Belarus is generally agreed to be questionable (see Chubrik and Kazlou, 2013).…”
Section: F Remittances and Human Capital Formationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet a significant number of Belarusian labour migrants areas are urban: as a rule, men maintain their families by working abroad. According to estimates based on the 2009 Census micro-data (Chubrik and Kazlou, 2013), rural areas' share in number labour migrants is lower than that in the total work force. Rural migrants comprise only 18.3% of working in Russia and 10.7% of labour migrants working in other countries.…”
Section: G Remittances Poverty and Income Inequalitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Wage differences between big Belarusian cities and Russia are less than those between small Belarusian towns or rural settlements and Russia, so labour migrants from bigger cities more often choose non-Russian destinations to get a higher salary. Chubrik and Kazlou (2013) are correct then when they argue that external labour migration in Belarus is more an urban than a rural phenomenon.…”
Section: G Remittances Poverty and Income Inequalitymentioning
The objective of the present paper is to evaluate the potential development impact and any possible side effects of remittances in Belarus. Our main finding, based on VAR modeling, is that we cannot consider remittances as a driver of economic growth in Belarus: their positive influence on GDP growth is not statistically significant. In fact, in the next period GDP responds negatively to remittances growth (p-value is 0.005). To some extent this may be a result of a productivity decrease conditioned by possible brain-drain effects and high employee turnover. Remittances appear to be strongly pro-cyclical with respect to Russian GDP and mildly procyclical with respect to the GDP of Belarus. Analysis shows that negative influence of remittances on GDP is not caused by Dutch disease and inflation: neither exchange rate appreciation nor growth in consumer price is induced by remittances. Instead, lagged REER devaluation Granger causes growth in remittances inflow (Wald test p-value is 0.051): when in a crisis devaluation takes place in Belarus more people go abroad to support their families and more transfers come from abroad.
“…Baltkrievija ir viena no nedaudzajām post-sociālisma ekonomikām, kas saglabāja valsts sektora dominanci un veidoja komplicētas subsīdiju sistēmas un ekonomisko atbalstu, kas paredzēts iedzīvotājiem, lai pārvaldītu politisko biznesa ciklu (Chubrik, Kazlou, 2013 Pētījumā piedalījās 96 jaunieši no Baltkrievijas, no kuriem 36 bija vīrieši un 60 sievietes. Vidējais jauniešu vecums, kas piedalījās pētījumā bija 26 gadi.…”
Section: Eiropas Valstu Pieredze/ Experience Of European Countriesunclassified
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