Counter Attacks for Bus-off Attacks

Souma, Daisuke; Mori, Akira; Yamamoto, Hideki; Hata, Yoichi

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-99229-7_27

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…The authors described a two-pronged countermeasure in which a node that observes F1 followed by F2 determines a bus-off attack is in progress. Others have used the same approach [32], [33].…”

Section: Bus-off Attack Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

WeepingCAN: A Stealthy CAN Bus-off Attack

Bloom¹

2021

Proceedings Third International Workshop on Automotive and Autonomous Vehicle Security

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The controller area network (CAN) is a high-value asset to defend and attack in automobiles. The bus-off attack exploits CAN's fault confinement to force a victim electronic control unit (ECU) into the bus-off state, which prevents it from using the bus. Although pernicious, the bus-off attack has two distinct phases that are observable on the bus and allow the attack to be detected and prevented. In this paper we present Weeping-CAN, a refinement of the bus-off attack that is stealthy and can escape detection. We evaluate WeepingCAN experimentally using realistic CAN benchmarks and find it succeeds in over 75% of attempts without exhibiting the detectable features of the original attack. We demonstrate WeepingCAN on a real vehicle.

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Section: Bus-off Attack Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

WeepingCAN: A Stealthy CAN Bus-off Attack

Bloom¹

2021

Proceedings Third International Workshop on Automotive and Autonomous Vehicle Security

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“…In 2018, Iehira et al [3] leveraged bus-off attack in the lab environment to completely prevent the transmission of regular messages sent from a target electronic control unit (ECU) even if the target ECU itself is not compromised. Around the same time, Souma et al [4] introduced counter attack as a potential countermeasure such that the node initiated bus-off attack itself falls into bus-off mode before the target node does. Later, this counter attack strategy was improved by Takada er al.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We analyze the case with closed loop attacker with the system model defined in (4). Under the dominant attack strategy, the controller's objective function reduces to:…”

Section: A Optimal Control With Closed-loop Attackermentioning

confidence: 99%

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Nash Equilibrium Control Policy against Bus-off Attacks in CAN Networks

Tang¹,

Shao²,

Song³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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A bus-off attack is a denial-of-service (DoS) attack which exploits error handling in the controller area network (CAN) to induce an honest node to disconnect itself from the CAN bus. This paper develops a stochastic transmission policy as a countermeasure for the controller-transmitter pair against the bus-off attack. We model this as a non-zero-sum linearquadratic-Gaussian game between the controller-transmitter pair and the attacker. We derive Nash equilibria of the game for two different information structures of the attacker. We show that the attacker has a dominant attack strategy under both information structures. Under the dominant attack strategy, we show that the optimal control policy is linear in the system state. We further identify a necessary and a sufficient conditions on the transmission policy to have bounded average cost. The theoretical results are complemented by a detailed case study of a bus-off attack on a vehicular adaptive cruise control model.

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CANSentry: Securing CAN-Based Cyber-Physical Systems against Denial and Spoofing Attacks

Humayed

Lin

et al. 2020

Computer Security – ESORICS 2020

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Counter Attacks for Bus-off Attacks

Cited by 7 publications

References 9 publications

WeepingCAN: A Stealthy CAN Bus-off Attack

WeepingCAN: A Stealthy CAN Bus-off Attack

Nash Equilibrium Control Policy against Bus-off Attacks in CAN Networks

CANSentry: Securing CAN-Based Cyber-Physical Systems against Denial and Spoofing Attacks

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