Counter Countermathematical Explanations

Kasirzadeh, Atoosa

doi:10.1007/s10670-021-00466-x

Cited by 3 publications

References 38 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

The Many Faces of Impossibility

Tanaka,

Sandgren

2024

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Possible worlds have revolutionised philosophy and some related fields. But, in recent years, tools based on possible worlds have been found to be limited in many respects. Impossible worlds have been introduced to overcome these limitations. This Element aims to raise and answer the neglected question of what is characteristically impossible about impossible worlds. The Element sheds new light on the nature of impossible worlds. It also aims to analyse the main features and utility of impossible worlds and examine how impossible worlds can capture distinctions which are unavailable if we limit ourselves to possible world-based tools.

show abstract

The Many Faces of Impossibility

Tanaka,

Sandgren

2024

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Explanation and the Right to Explanation

TAYLOR

2023

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In response to widespread use of automated decision-making technology, some have considered a right to explanation. In this article, I draw on insights from philosophical work on explanation to present a series of challenges to this idea, showing that the normative motivations for access to such explanations ask for something difficult, if not impossible, to extract from automated systems. I consider an alternative, outcomes-focused approach to the normative evaluation of automated decision making and recommend it as a way to pursue the goods originally associated with explainability.

show abstract

A noetic account of explanation in mathematics

D’Alessandro,

Lehet

2024

The Philosophical Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We defend a noetic account of intramathematical explanation. On this view, a piece of mathematics is explanatory just in case it produces understanding of an appropriate type. We motivate the view by presenting some appealing features of noeticism. We then discuss and criticize the most prominent extant version of noeticism, due to Inglis and Mejía Ramos, which identifies explanatory understanding with the possession of well-organized cognitive schemas. Finally, we present a novel noetic account. On our view, explanatory understanding arises from meeting specific explanatory objectives. We defend a cluster-concept account of explanatory objectives and identify four important subfamilies within the relevant network of resemblance relations. The resulting view is objectivist (in the sense that it takes explanatory success to be a matter of observer-independent fact), broader in scope than why-question-based accounts, compatible with empirical findings on experts’ explanatory judgments, and capable of generalizing (with appropriate provisos) to scientific explanation as a whole. It thus fulfills Friedman’s half-century-old demand for a general and objectivist theory, which accounts for the link between explanation and understanding.

show abstract

Counter Countermathematical Explanations

Cited by 3 publications

References 38 publications

The Many Faces of Impossibility

The Many Faces of Impossibility

Explanation and the Right to Explanation

A noetic account of explanation in mathematics

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About