Harrigan and Spekkens give formal definitions for the wavefunction in quantum mechanics to be ψ-ontic or ψ-epistemic, such that the wavefunction can only be one or the other. We argue that nothing about the informal ideas of epistemic and ontic interpretations rules out wavefunctions representing both reality and knowledge. The implications of the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem and many other issues need to be rethought in the light of our analysis.1 The terminology of 'ontic' versus 'epistemic' states is problematic not only for the reasons we give, but it has become standard among physicists working in quantum foundations. 2 Note that this is not to say that wavefunctions are physical things, but that they represent something physical, just as the correspondence between your fingers and the numbers one to ten does not make the numbers themselves physical [9-11]. 3 Leifer's corresponding example of an epistemic state is then the probability distribution over the particle's phase space.