Counterfactual potency.

Abstract

Counterfactual thoughts typically take the form of implied or explicit if-then statements. We propose that the multiplicative combination of "if likelihood" (the degree to which the antecedent condition of the counterfactual is perceived to be likely) and "then likelihood" (the perceived conditional likelihood of the outcome of the counterfactual, given the antecedent condition) determine the strength and impact of counterfactuals. This construct, termed counterfactual potency, is a reliable predictor of the degree of influence of counterfactual thinking upon judgments of regret, causation, and responsibility. Through 4 studies, we demonstrate the predictive power of this construct in a variety of contexts and show that it plays a causal role in determining the strength of the effects of counterfactual thought. Implications of counterfactual potency as a central factor of counterfactual influence are discussed.

When contributions make a difference: Explaining order effects in responsibility attribution

“…Our proposal is in line with recent work that has highlighted the close relationship between counterfactuals and attributions of causality and responsibility (Chockler & Halpern, 2004;Halpern & Pearl, 2005;Petrocelli, Percy, Sherman, & Tormala, 2011). According to Chockler and Halpern's structural model of responsibility, an agent is maximally responsible if she made a difference in the actual situation.…”

Sensitizing Potential Jurors to Variations in Eyewitness Evidence Quality Using Counterfactual Thinking

“…The first factor is the availability of alternatives to both the outcome and antecedent. If alternative antecedents and outcomes can be reasonably imagined (Jimenez-Leal & Chater, 2008;Mandel, 2005), then the mutability of an antecedent will influence these probability judgments; specifically, as the number of plausible mutations to the antecedent that would not produce that particular outcome increases, the prior probability of that outcome decreases, and causation attributed to that antecedent increases (Spellman & Mandel, 1999; see also Petrocelli, Percy, Sherman, & Tormala, 2011, for a discussion of counterfactual potency). That is, if there are many alternative antecedents that would not have resulted in the same outcome, then the (prior) probability of that outcome occurring is lowered; as a result, because the outcome did occur, causation is attributed to the antecedent.…”

Causal superseding

“…There are many accounts of how counterfactual reasoning interacts with causal judgment (e.g., Gerstenberg, Goodman, Lagnado & Tenenbaum, 2014;Lewis, 1973;Petrocelli, Percy, Sherman, & Tormala, 2011; but see Mandel, 2003). We focus here on an aspect of the relationship between counterfactuals and causation that has been referred to as sensitivity (or robustness) of causation (Hitchcock, 2012;Knobe & Szabó, 2013;Lombrozo, 2010;Woodward, 2006).…”

“…However, when A"s action was normal, counterfactual possibilities involving an alternative abnormal action do not come to mind so naturally. Thus, A"s action is perceived to have made more of a difference to the outcome when it was abnormal than when it was normal (Petrocelli et al, 2011).…”