Counterfactuals and Propositional Contingentism

Fritz, P.; Goodman, Jeremy

doi:10.1017/s1755020317000144

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…to capture in clever fashion the idea that a counterfactual φ > ψ holds just in case the possible world satisfying φ that is the most similar to the actual world also satisfies ψ. While as is plain we are not fans of possible-worlds semantics, those attracted to such an approach to counterfactuals would do well in our opinion to survey (Fritz and Goodman 2017).…”

Section: Needed Expressivitymentioning

confidence: 97%

Counterfactual Conditionals in Quantified Modal Logic

Govindarajulu,

Bringsjord

2017

Preprint

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We present a novel formalization of counterfactual conditionals in a quantified modal logic. Counterfactual conditionals play a vital role in ethical and moral reasoning. Prior work has shown that moral reasoning systems (and more generally, theory-of-mind reasoning systems) should be at least as expressive as first-order (quantified) modal logic (QML) to be well-behaved. While existing work on moral reasoning has focused on counterfactual-free QML moral reasoning, we present a fully specified and implemented formal system that includes counterfactual conditionals. We validate our model with two projects. In the first project, we demonstrate that our system can be used to model a complex moral principle, the doctrine of double effect. In the second project, we use the system to build a data-set with true and false counterfactuals as licensed by our theory, which we believe can be useful for other researchers. This project also shows that our model can be computationally feasible.

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Section: Needed Expressivitymentioning

confidence: 97%

Counterfactual Conditionals in Quantified Modal Logic

Govindarajulu,

Bringsjord

2017

Preprint

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“…Not all recent advocates of higher‐order propositions are motivated by considerations such as the above. As with properties, for instance Stalnaker (2012), Williamson (2013), and Fritz and Goodman (2017b) instead locate the main advantage of the higher‐order conception of propositions in its potential to advance debates concerning the logic and metaphysics of modality (on which see §5 below).…”

Section: Higher‐order Conceptions Of Propositions and Factsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Higher‐order metaphysics

Skiba

2021

Philosophy Compass

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Subverting a once widely held Quinean paradigm, there is a growing consensus among philosophers of logic that higher‐order quantifiers (which bind variables in the syntactic position of predicates and sentences) are a perfectly legitimate and useful instrument in the logico‐philosophical toolbox, while neither being reducible to nor fully explicable in terms of first‐order quantifiers (which bind variables in singular term position). This article discusses the impact of this quantificational paradigm shift on metaphysics, focussing on theories of properties, propositions, and identity, as well as on the metaphysics of modality.

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Some Ways the Ways the World Could Have Been Can’t Be

Masterman

2024

J Philos Logic

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Let serious propositional contingentism (SPC) be the package of views which consists in (i) the thesis that propositions expressed by sentences featuring terms depend, for their existence, on the existence of the referents of those terms, (ii) serious actualism—the view that it is impossible for an object to exemplify a property and not exist—and (iii) contingentism—the view that it is at least possible that some thing might not have been something. SPC is popular and compelling. But what should we say about possible worlds, if we accept SPC? Here, I first show that a natural view of possible worlds, well-represented in the literature, in conjunction with SPC is inadequate. Though I note various alternative ways of thinking about possible worlds in response to the first problem, I then outline a second more general problem—a master argument—which generally shows that any account of possible worlds meeting very minimal requirements will be inconsistent with compelling claims about mere possibilia which the serious propositional contingentist should accept.

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Counterfactuals and Propositional Contingentism

Cited by 7 publications

References 20 publications

Counterfactual Conditionals in Quantified Modal Logic

Counterfactual Conditionals in Quantified Modal Logic

Higher‐order metaphysics

Some Ways the Ways the World Could Have Been Can’t Be

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