Countering a climate of instability: the future of relative stability under the Common Fisheries Policy

Abstract

European fisheries are at a critical juncture. The confluence of political change and environmental change, along with the challenges of past Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) reforms such as the landing obligation, creates a once in a generation opportunity for a paradigm shift in fisheries management in the region. This paper sets out a series of arguments for why the status quo situation for the governance of European Union fisheries, especially for shared Northeast Atlantic fisheries is very likely unsustainable under these new circumstances. At stake is confidence in, and support for the management of the regions shared fisheries, the economic viability of fisheries and sustainability of stocks. Brexit is an additional incentive to unlock the potential of existing, but little used mechanisms within the CFP to allow the reimagining of fisheries management and governance in the Northeast Atlantic. Three of these tools and mechanisms are (i) Quota swapping, (ii) Article 16 quota uplift provisions, (iii) and Article 15 flexibility mechanisms. These mechanisms can be adopted by individual Member States for fleets in their waters or in the case of quota swapping be applied across Member States and may help stabilize fisheries under these stressors.

Catch–quota matching allowances balance economic and ecological targets in a fishery managed by individual transferable quota

“…Several of our results have important policy implications. First, the arbitrage incentive that arises from species quota transformation ratios that are not aligned with quota markets should be considered when fisheries managers consider the implementation of such mechanisms e.g., in the context of the common fisheries policy in the European Union (4). Such incentives could result in systematic overfishing especially in cases where a highly constraining factor/species such as the Atlantic cod in the Icelandic case is absent.…”

“…Harvesters in mixed-species individual quota fisheries (IQs or, if transferable, ITQs) potentially face a dilemma; what to do if they run out of quota in one species before they have used up remaining quota in other species ( 1 , 2 ). One possible response, continuing to fish but discarding excess catch, has negative consequences and is now prohibited in many fisheries ( 3 , 4 ). Purchasing additional quota can help but is sometimes not possible: If trade is prohibited for broader reasons ( 5 ), a particular quota is scarce due to a systemwide imbalance ( 6 , 7 ), or frictional trading costs are high.…”

“…For these reasons, catch–quota balancing mechanisms have been introduced in a number of fisheries ( 8 ). Despite their limited track record, balancing mechanisms are likely to play an increasingly important role in fisheries management due to proliferation of ITQ systems ( 9 ) and discard bans ( 4 ), climate change-driven perturbation of marine ecosystems ( 10 , 11 ), as well as the low amount of catch compared to quota in several mixed ITQ systems and the resulting loss of potential catch value ( 12 , 13 ).…”

Making Brexit work for the environment and livelihoods: Delivering a stakeholder informed vision for agriculture and fisheries

“…Yet, Brexit does provide an opportunity for the UK and EU to work more collaboratively (and in line with international agreements) by, for example, jointly assessing the distribution of North East Atlantic fish stocks and using more evidence‐based approaches such as zonal attachment to allocate quotas of shared stocks (Harte, Tiller, Kailis, & Burden, ; Pinsky et al, ; Stewart & O’Leary, ). Climate change‐induced shifts in fish distribution will undoubtedly produce increased conflicts over resource use in the future, not just in the North East Atlantic, but also on a global scale (Pinsky et al, ).…”

Changing fish distributions challenge the effective management of European fisheries

“…The above examples highlight the ‘wicked problem’ (van Hoof ) created by fixed allocation schemes like RS, devised under markedly different ecological conditions, when fish distributions were different. Yet, despite its flaws being increasingly documented (Harte et al ), RS is still being used to allocate quotas. While quota swapping mitigates the problem, in some cases not enough swaps can be arranged, and the current swapping systems in the EU are not yet transparent enough to work effectively (Hoefnagel et al ).…”