Countering Violent Extremism Online: The Experiences of Informal Counter Messaging Actors

Abstract

The online space is a haven for extremists of all kinds. Although efforts to remove violent and extremist content are increasing, there is a widely accepted need to also contest extremist messages with counter messages designed to undermine and disrupt extremist narratives. While the majority of academic focus has been on large and well‐funded efforts linked to governments, this article considers the experiences of informal actors who are active in contesting extremist messaging but who lack the support of large institutions. Informal actors come without some of the baggage that accompanies formal counter message campaigns, which have been attacked as lacking in credibility and constituting “just more government propaganda.” This has been noted by some of the wider countering violent extremism industry and the appetite for incorporating “real‐world” content in their campaigns seems to be rising. This article fills a gap in our knowledge of the experiences of informal counter messaging actors. Through a series of in‐depth qualitative interviews it demonstrates that, despite the potentially serious risks of incorporating greater levels of informal content, there is an appetite among informal actors to engage with formal campaigns where they can be selective over who they work with and maintain a degree of control.

Countering Extremists on Social Media: Challenges for Strategic Communication and Content Moderation

“…Bilazarian's recommendation to focus on networked approaches, interpersonal messaging, and going beyond the narrow frame of counter‐extremism when considering relevant actors in online CVE sets the stage for Benjamin Lee's work on informal counter‐narratives and Irfan Chaudhry and Anatoliy Gruzd's work on comment section racism on Facebook news pages. Where Bilazarian develops policy recommendations that can better guide online‐oriented CVE, Lee (2020) and Chaudhry and Gruzd (2020) provide a granular examination of the challenges facing primary CVE on and through social media.…”

Democracy in the digital era

“…From these contributions and others, we know that the democratic political process is directly undermined when political actors and foreign governments manipulate and, in some cases, weaponize the flow of information online to influence the outcome of elections (North et al, 2021; Yoon et al, 2022). We have also seen how the spread of misinformation, disinformation, and conspiracy theories, the amplification of partisan voices, and the targeting of marginalized demographics weaken social cohesion by exacerbating societal divisions and eroding the trust that people have in one another, democratic institutions, and elections (Dobreva et al, 2020; Gruzd & Roy, 2014; Karlsson et al, 2021; Lee, 2020; Mena, 2020; Ng & Taeihagh, 2021).…”

How Do Individuals in a Radical Echo Chamber React to Opposing Views? Evidence from a Content Analysis of Stormfront

“…While the impact of radical echo chambers is well-researched, how to best counter the threat they pose to society is a source of ongoing debate (Braddock & Horgan, 2016;Ganesh & Bright, 2019). Recently, significant efforts have been deployed by government, civil society, and activists to break up radical echo chambers by injecting them with opposing viewpoints and narratives that challenge their members' beliefs or offer alternative perspectives (Ganesh & Bright, 2019;Lee, 2020;Rosand & Winterbotham, 2019). Despite being a widespread strategic communication technique, research assessing the efficacy of counter-attitudinal messaging is still sparse and inconclusive (Ferguson, 2016), with some studies suggesting that such tactics may even be counter-productive (Castro & Hemmingsen, 2017;Schmitt et al, 2018).…”