Counterinsurgency's Impossible Trilemma

Abstract

Ever since the conventional wars in Iraq and Afghanistan turned into irregular conflicts, both students of war and practitioners have furiously debated counterinsurgency's logic, goals, and chances of success. 1 Counterinsurgency doctrine, however, has experienced no radical change since its original development. It was originally, though not systematically, formulated in the twentieth century by none other than the British officer, T.E. Lawrence, and later extended, on the basis of the writings of Mao, by a variety of counterrevolutionary strategists such as the French theorists of la guerre revolutionnaire. Even the new counterinsurgency doctrine devised by General David Petraeus in Iraq and Afghanistan does not represent a fundamental shift away from its traditional understanding, which sees this type of conflict as a contest for the support and control of population and, in turn, places the security of the populace at the hub of military operations. 2 While at present there is general agreement on how to carry out counterinsurgency, 3 a clear analysis of the tradeoffs that all counterinsurgents have to deal with is still lacking. While challenges within the field remain, counterinsurgency still faces numerous challenges in theory. Neither scholars nor practitioners have developed a theoretical framework that has been able to explicitly specify the existing tradeoffs among the three typical goals involved in this doctrine.

Combatant socialization and norms of restraint: Examining officer training at the US Military Academy and Army ROTC

“…Cronin (2018); Kaempf (2018); Smith (2008). On the related trilemma of counterinsurgency strategy, see Zambernardi (2010). 14 Emphasis added.…”

Counterinsurgency Ecotourism in Guatemala's Maya Biosphere Reserve

“…Fueled by manufactured or perceived threats to the state during the Cold War, the Guatemalan army's target of counterinsurgency tactics was the Marxist 'subversive' (subversivo) and its civilian support base (Schirmer, 1998). Counterinsurgency warfare is also defined by the difficulty counterinsurgency forces face in distinguishing noncombatants from combatants, which often results in widespread violence inflicted on civilians (Zambernardi, 2010). In Guatemala this violence turned genocidal when the army murdered or 'disappeared' over 200 000 civilians, mostly Maya (Jonas, 2000), and made 'fear a way of life' through psychological warfare waged against the survivors (Greene, 1999).…”

Demokratischer Krieg am Hindukusch? Eine kritische Analyse der Bundestagsdebatten zur deutschen Afghanistanpolitik 2001–2011

“…Vorfälle wie die umstrittenen Luftangriffe auf einen entführten Tanklastwagen in Kunduz im September 2009 oder die Bombardierungen von Hochzeitsfesten sind nicht lediglich "Fehler", die durch bessere Bewaffnung und höheren Personalaufwand vermeidbar wären, sie sind vielmehr unvermeidliche Begleiterscheinungen des Krieges: Der "Kollateralschaden" ist kein Zufall, sondern gehört zum Krieg wie das normale Gefecht, ist Teil der bereits von Clausewitz als Natur des Krieges erkannten "Friktionen" (Kahl 2007, S. 26). In Guerillakriegen mit Terroreinlagen, in dem Freund und Feind für die regulären Streitkräfte besonders schwer zu unterscheiden sind, sind die drei Ziele moderner Aufstandsbekämpfung 7 -Schutz der eigenen Truppen, Schutz der Bevölkerung und Vernichtung des Feindes -schlechterdings nicht simultan erreichbar (Rudolph 2011, S. 17;Zambernardi 2010). Diese Dynamik ist umso virulenter, je fragmentierter die betroffene Gesellschaft ist, je mehr es an einer geschlossenen und fähigen lokalen Staatsführung mangelt und je weniger belastbare administrative Strukturen aus dem Vorgängerregime vorhanden sind.…”