Counterintuitive Expert Psychological Evidence in Child Sexual Abuse Trials in New Zealand

Greater Knowledge Enhances Complainant Credibility and Increases Jury Convictions for Child Sexual Assault

“…However, the case facts also included a number of unrepresentative features of CSA cases, i.e., the complaint entailed (a) a single abusive event, a one-off instance rather than a series of recurring abusive events; (b) immediate rather than delayed disclosure; (c) the child victim was 12 years of age thus less suggestible than many younger children; (d) the victim resisted; and (e) a corroborating witness observed the complainant and the accused with their pants down and overheard the victim tell the accused to stop. Inclusion of the latter series of facts strengthened the evidence against the accused, supporting potential convictions, but decreased the goodness of fit between the case facts and typical counter-intuitive specialized CSA knowledge that is often the basis for expert evidence (Seymour et al, 2013 ). Prior research has shown that when this fit is poor, jurors may disregard the educative evidence or infer that the mismatch and atypical features indicate that the complainant was not sexually assaulted (Horan and Goodman-Delahunty, 2020 ).…”

“…In Australia, child sexual assault (CSA) cases typically result in low conviction rates, possibly because of a lack of corroborative evidence to prove the alleged sexual abuse (Cossins, 2020 ) but also because of research findings suggesting a strong relationship between juror misconceptions about CSA, such as expectations that the victim will resist and immediately report the abuse (Quas et al, 2005 ; Cossins, 2008 ; Cossins et al, 2009 ), low assessments of complainant credibility (Gabora et al, 1993 ), and a high acquittal rate (Wundersitz, 2003 ; Fitzgerald, 2006 ; Goodman-Delahunty et al, 2017a , b ). Several studies have documented juror uncertainty and/or lack of knowledge about children's reactions to sexual assault which is incongruent with responses of sexually abused children, especially when the abuser is known to the complainant (Cossins et al, 2009 ; Seymour et al, 2013 ). Jurors may disregard counter-intuitive evidence which contradicts common CSA beliefs and stereotypes, and may rely on misperceptions and erroneous stereotypes in the absence of forensic evidence (Cossins and Goodman-Delahunty, 2013 ).…”

Improving Child Protection by Integrating Research Evidence and Clinical Experience

“…More generally, there have been reports of poor standards in expert witnesses in the UK and Canada (Ireland 2012;Cradock 2011), while concerns about the validity of expert witness testimony are reported in the US (Johnston and Sartwelle 2013). The UK has recently moved to reduce the use of any kind of expert witness in Family Court proceedings (Ministry of Justice and Department of Education 2014), though elsewhere expert witnesses' explanations have been valuable in assisting juries to appreciate the significance of counter-intuitive evidence (Seymour et al 2014). So, there is a continuing need to improve both the reliability and validity of expert assessments of child abuse, and the confidence any legal system may place in them.…”

Data_Sheet_1.PDF

“…However, the case facts also included a number of unrepresentative features of CSA cases, i.e., the complaint entailed (a) a single abusive event, a one-off instance rather than a series of recurring abusive events; (b) immediate rather than delayed disclosure; (c) the child victim was 12 years of age thus less suggestible than many younger children; (d) the victim resisted; and (e) a corroborating witness observed the complainant and the accused with their pants down and overheard the victim tell the accused to stop. Inclusion of the latter series of facts strengthened the evidence against the accused, supporting potential convictions, but decreased the goodness of fit between the case facts and typical counter-intuitive specialized CSA knowledge that is often the basis for expert evidence (Seymour et al, 2013). Prior research has shown that when this fit is poor, jurors may disregard the educative evidence or infer that the mismatch and atypical features indicate that the complainant was not sexually assaulted (Horan and Goodman-Delahunty, 2020).…”

“…In Australia, child sexual assault (CSA) cases typically result in low conviction rates, possibly because of a lack of corroborative evidence to prove the alleged sexual abuse (Cossins, 2020) but also because of research findings suggesting a strong relationship between juror misconceptions about CSA, such as expectations that the victim will resist and immediately report the abuse (Quas et al, 2005;Cossins, 2008;Cossins et al, 2009), low assessments of complainant credibility (Gabora et al, 1993), and a high acquittal rate (Wundersitz, 2003;Fitzgerald, 2006;Goodman-Delahunty et al, 2017a,b). Several studies have documented juror uncertainty and/or lack of knowledge about children's reactions to sexual assault which is incongruent with responses of sexually abused children, especially when the abuser is known to the complainant (Cossins et al, 2009;Seymour et al, 2013). Jurors may disregard counter-intuitive evidence which contradicts common CSA beliefs and stereotypes, and may rely on misperceptions and erroneous stereotypes in the absence of forensic evidence (Cossins and Goodman-Delahunty, 2013).…”