Countermeasures against fault attacks on software implemented AES

Barenghi, Alessandro; Breveglieri, Luca; Koren, Israel; Pelosi, Gerardo; Regazzoni, Francesco

doi:10.1145/1873548.1873555

Cited by 77 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Software countermeasures can be designed at different levels, such as at an algorithmic level [6], in a high-level programming language [7][8][9] or at assembly level [10][11][12]. While higher level countermeasures may be optimized away or altered by a compiler, low-level countermeasures are compatible with existing compilers and toolchains.…”

Section: Many Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Software countermeasures are often based on temporal redundancy (i.e. performing the same computation multiple times) to detect or tolerate errors during computations [10,12,8,11]. Control flow protection requires different mechanisms to detect a modification of the execution flow [7,14].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…al. propose assembly-level countermeasures based on software redundancy and parity checking to detect instruction skips [10]. The proposed countermeasure scheme, based on instruction duplication and triplication, is claimed to be robust against any single instruction skip fault.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…al. [10] should be able to detect some instruction replacement faults, the exact types of replacements are not analyzed.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…al. explored countermeasures and detections against fault attacks based on software redundancy [10]. Listings 7 and 8 illustrate how these techniques can be used to protect a load instruction.…”

Section: Instruction Duplicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Efficient Design and Evaluation of Countermeasures against Fault Attacks Using Formal Verification

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Heydemann

Encrenaz

et al. 2016

Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications

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Abstract. This paper presents a formal verification framework and tool that evaluates the robustness of software countermeasures against faultinjection attacks. By modeling reference assembly code and its protected variant as automata, the framework can generate a set of equations for an SMT solver, the solutions of which represent possible attack paths. Using the tool we developed, we evaluated the robustness of state-of-theart countermeasures against fault injection attacks. Based on insights gathered from this evaluation, we analyze any remaining weaknesses and propose applications of these countermeasures that are more robust.

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