“…Figure 2:Government Responses to Workers’ Collective Actions in Guangdong, 2008–2016 Source: For 2008 and 2010, we used the data from “China strikes.” For other years, we used data from the China Labor Bulletin. Notes: The China Labor Bulletin collection only covers the years after 2011, the last year of the Hu–Wen administration. In order to better capture the differences between the Hu–Wen and Xi Jinping administration, we added the data from (Elfstrom 2017). The data only cover the years after 2008.…”
Section: How Do Local Governments React To Workers’ Collective Actions?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The China Labor Bulletin collection only covers the years after 2011, the last year of the Hu–Wen administration. In order to better capture the differences between the Hu–Wen and Xi Jinping administration, we added the data from (Elfstrom 2017). The data only cover the years after 2008.…”
Section: How Do Local Governments React To Workers’ Collective Actions?mentioning
While Chinese local governments remain extremely wary of workers’ collective actions, they do not always suppress them; sometimes, they tolerate such actions and even seek to placate workers. What accounts for these different government responses to workers’ collective actions? Based on a sample of over 1,491 collective action cases that took place in Guangdong between 2011 and 2016, we find that the types of demands raised by workers during collective actions affect how local governments respond. Local governments are likely to forcefully intervene in collective actions in which workers make defensive claims concerning issues of payment. In contrast, local governments are likely to use non-forceful approaches in response to actions in which workers make defensive claims regarding social security.
“…Figure 2:Government Responses to Workers’ Collective Actions in Guangdong, 2008–2016 Source: For 2008 and 2010, we used the data from “China strikes.” For other years, we used data from the China Labor Bulletin. Notes: The China Labor Bulletin collection only covers the years after 2011, the last year of the Hu–Wen administration. In order to better capture the differences between the Hu–Wen and Xi Jinping administration, we added the data from (Elfstrom 2017). The data only cover the years after 2008.…”
Section: How Do Local Governments React To Workers’ Collective Actions?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The China Labor Bulletin collection only covers the years after 2011, the last year of the Hu–Wen administration. In order to better capture the differences between the Hu–Wen and Xi Jinping administration, we added the data from (Elfstrom 2017). The data only cover the years after 2008.…”
Section: How Do Local Governments React To Workers’ Collective Actions?mentioning
While Chinese local governments remain extremely wary of workers’ collective actions, they do not always suppress them; sometimes, they tolerate such actions and even seek to placate workers. What accounts for these different government responses to workers’ collective actions? Based on a sample of over 1,491 collective action cases that took place in Guangdong between 2011 and 2016, we find that the types of demands raised by workers during collective actions affect how local governments respond. Local governments are likely to forcefully intervene in collective actions in which workers make defensive claims concerning issues of payment. In contrast, local governments are likely to use non-forceful approaches in response to actions in which workers make defensive claims regarding social security.
“…In 2005, the number increased by 6.6% over 2004 to 87,000, that is, an average of 240 incidents each day ( Xinhua, ). While the Ministry of Public Security has since ceased to release annual data relating to mass protests around the country, anecdotal evidence and unofficial statistics showed the proliferation of public order disturbances (Crothall, ; Elfstrom, )…”
Section: Labor Protests Strikes and Arbitrated Disputesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Manfred Elfstrom (, p. 17) cited the independent efforts in tracing the numbers of labor protests in China despite the political sensitivity of the research projects. The data sets, for example, are compiled by Manfred Elfstrom (University of Southern California), Chen Chi‐Jou (Academia Sinica), Li Yao (Harvard Ash Center), and nongovernmental labor rights group.…”
China's reintegration into global capitalism has greatly transformed migration patterns and labor relations since the late 1970s. This article focuses on worker activism in this transformation. It shows that the dynamic interactions between worker mobilization and government reaction have continued to shape the forms and outcomes of labor contention. Aggrieved workers have used legal and extralegal strategies to defend their rights and interests. In response, from the early 2000s, the leadership has sought to preserve social stability by raising minimum wages, extending social insurance coverage, and expanding access to grievance redress. But freedom of association remains severely restricted. Labor nongovernmental organizations and more recently a new generation of left‐wing university students have attempted to fill the representation gap to support workers in struggle. State and labor relations remain contentious in Chinese development.
Le présent article vise à reprendre un certain nombre d’informations sur le fonctionnement de la Chine, la propagation et le traitement du Coronavirus. Il considère que le mode de gouvernance chinoise actuel est pour beaucoup sinon dans l’apparition de la maladie Covid-19, du moins dans sa transformation en une pandémie. Il s’appuie sur les travaux que notre équipe a menés sur la Chine depuis 1989, notamment à travers un laboratoire de recherche sur les organisations de l’Université Sun Yatsen à Canton que j’ai dirigé de 2000 à 2014 inclus. Il s’appuie aussi sur des collaborations et le soutien de nombreux collègues d’autres disciplines que nous ne pouvons citer tous, et notamment d’Isabelle Attané (Directrice de recherche à l’Institut national d’études démographiques), de Denis Vital-Durand (Professeur à la faculté de médecine de Lyon), et de Jorge Walter ( conicet -Universidad de San Andrés, Argentine). En 2002-2003, la pandémie d’un premier coronavirus avait été évitée par les actions et le comportement de la population chinoise et de ses gouvernements. Cette fois-ci, c’est à un échec que nous assistons. Espérons que les leçons en seront tirées.
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