Coupling, Constitution, and the Cognitive Kind: A Reply to Adams and Aizawa

Clark, Andrew

doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0005

Cited by 111 publications

(83 citation statements)

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“…4 Although the postulation of extended mental states is not necessary for making the case for HEC, allowing us to bypass the long debate that Otto has generated (I will return to the Otto case in the concluding section), the discussion of this example is helpful as it has produced some very interesting intuitions on what is required for an external artifact to count as a putative part of one's overall cognitive economy. In particular, investigating the case in more detail, Clark (2010a) notes that the availability and portability of the resource of information might be crucial. Accordingly, he offers the following set of additional criteria to be met by non-biological candidates for inclusion into an individual's cognitive system (2010a, 46) 5 : 1) "That the resource be reliably available and typically invoked".…”

Section: The Hypothesis Of Extended Cognition the 'Causal-constitutimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In other words, if any external element that both satisfies the 'glue and trust' criteria and causally affects one's cognitive processes is to count as part of one's cognitive system, we are going to be led to a 'cognitive bloat' (Clark 2001, Rowlands 2009) whereby cognition will seem like leaking all the way out in implausibly many directions. Eventually, the worry further goes, we will be led to an "unacceptable proliferation of systems (many of them extremely short lived)" (Rupert 2004, 396).…”

Section: The Hypothesis Of Extended Cognition the 'Causal-constitutimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Even though not entirely clear in (Clark & Chalmers 1998), Clark (2007;2008) intends continuous mutual interactions as only sufficient for cognitive extensionprobably to allow space for the Extended Mind hypothesis as motivated by the Otto and similar cases, where (possibly) no such interactions are involved. Regardless of the potential stringency of the move (I will return to this issue in section 5), it is tempting to accentuate the importance of this criterion by treating it as both a sufficient and necessary condition on cognitive extension.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Clark (2008) and Wheeler (2005) have pointed towards this direction and some critiques of HEC are aware of the force of this argumentative line (Rupert 2009). Moreover, Chemero (2009) has suggested in passing an efficient response to the 'causal-constitution' fallacy, which is technically equivalent to the one we will be here considering.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Loops, constitution, and cognitive extension

Palermos

2014

Cognitive Systems Research

101

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Abstract:The 'causal-constitution' fallacy, the 'cognitive bloat' worry, and the persisting theoretical confusion about the fundamental difference between the hypotheses of embedded (HEMC) and extended (HEC) cognition are three interrelated worries, whose common point-and the problem they accentuate-is the lack of a principled criterion of constitution. Attempting to address the 'causal-constitution' fallacy, mathematically oriented philosophers of mind have previously suggested that the presence of non-linear relations between the inner and the outer contributions is sufficient for cognitive extension. The abstract idea of non-linearity, however, can be easily misunderstood and has, in the past, led to incorrect and counterintuitive conclusions about what may count as part of one's overall cognitive system. In order to prevent any further mistakes I revisit dynamical systems theory to study the nature of the continuous mutual interactions that give rise to the aforementioned non-linear relations. Moreover, focusing on these interactions will allow us to provide two distinct arguments in support of the ontological postulation of extended cognitive systems, as well as an objective criterion of constitution. Accordingly, I put forward a version of HEC that treats continuous mutual interactions (and the resultant non-linear relations) not just as sufficient but also as necessary for cognitive extension. Such a qualified version of HEC may exclude certain alleged cases of cognitive extension where the agent does not mutually interact with his artifacts (e.g., shopping lists and directory services), but it is immune both to the 'causalconstitution' fallacy and the 'cognitive bloat' worry, and it can be sharply distinguished from HEMC.

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Section: The Hypothesis Of Extended Cognition the 'Causal-constitutimentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Hypothesis Of Extended Cognition the 'Causal-constitutimentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Loops, constitution, and cognitive extension

Palermos

2014

Cognitive Systems Research

101

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“…Carruthers' objection has also been treated extensively elsewhere, shifting the focus from parity to the complementary use of external objects. 15 Sutton advocates for complementarity by suggesting that exograms do not pair with a brain. Rather they are used as cognitive tools in ways that can be used internally, with memory palaces being the prime example.…”

Section: In Defense Of Exogramsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Semiotic Exograms: Extending the Mind Fully

Reimanis

2017

IJURCA

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This essay is an analysis and expanded defense of John Sutton's essay "Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process." The first section of the essay surveys the extended mind literature, following the first and second waves of the Extended Mind theory. The second section explains Sutton's exograms as external representations of internal thought. This section also details his argument that exograms extend the mind because, historically, exograms play a role in the internal functioning of a mind. The third section defends Sutton's argument from objections against their place in mental processes, namely memory. The fourth section argues against the objection that the mind cannot be extended beyond the brain, by appealing to a computational view of functionalism. The conclusions drawn from the third and fourth sections are that the mind, through language, extends with culture and that, even in cognitive science, it is fruitful to study the mind extended as such.

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Epistemic Complementarity: Steps to a Second Wave Extended Epistemology

Andrada

2021

The Mind-Technology Problem

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In this chapter, I propose a new framework for extended epistemology, based on a second-wave approach to extended cognition. The framework is inclusive, in that it takes into account the complex interplay between the diverse embodiments of extended knowers and the salient properties of technological artifacts, as well as the environment in which they are embedded. Thus it both emphasizes and exploits the complementary roles played by these different elements. Finally, I motivate and explain this framework by applying it to a case of interaction with contemporary technologies.

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Coupling, Constitution, and the Cognitive Kind: A Reply to Adams and Aizawa

Cited by 111 publications

References 1 publication

Loops, constitution, and cognitive extension

Loops, constitution, and cognitive extension

Semiotic Exograms: Extending the Mind Fully

Epistemic Complementarity: Steps to a Second Wave Extended Epistemology

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