Coups d’état and defense spending: a counterfactual analysis

Bove, V. Michael; Nisticò, Robert

doi:10.1007/s11127-014-0202-2

Cited by 43 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Aksoy et al (2015) show that terrorism increases the probability of coups in autocracies, which is consistent with other studies stressing that domestic and external security threats raise the risk of coups (e.g. Ezrow and Frantz, 2011; Goemans, 2008; Marinov and Goemans, 2014; Piplani and Talmadge, 2016; Powell, 2012; Svolik, 2013; Bove and Nisticò, 2014a; Bove and Rivera, 2015). However, even though coups marked the 20th century, these events are rare and affect autocracies disproportionately.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 90%

Beyond coups: terrorism and military involvement in politics

Bove

Rivera

Ruffa

2019

European Journal of International Relations

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A wealth of research in comparative politics and international relations examines how the military intervenes in politics via coups. We shift attention to broader forms of military involvement in politics beyond coups and claim that terrorist violence and the threat of terror attacks provide a window of opportunity for military intervention, without taking full control of state institutions. We highlight two mechanisms through which terrorism influences military involvement in politics: (1) government authorities demand military expertise to fight terrorism and strengthen national security and “pull” the armed forces into politics, and (2) state armed actors exploit their informational advantage over civilian authorities to “push” their way into politics and policy-making. A panel data analysis shows that domestic terror attacks and perceived threats from domestic and transnational terrorist organizations increase military involvement in politics. We illustrate the theoretical mechanisms with the cases of France (1995–1998 and 2015–2016) and Algeria (1989–1992).

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 90%

Beyond coups: terrorism and military involvement in politics

Bove

Rivera

Ruffa

2019

European Journal of International Relations

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“…Finally, it also envisaged provision of a basic package of healthcare services, with plans to expand this over time and increase financial protection [12]. However, the empirical literature suggests that military coups (as the one staged in Myanmar on February 1, 2021) are usually accompanied with significant increases in military expenditure that crowds out social spending [49]. To what extent this has already occurred and will continue to do so is yet to be assessed.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluation of progress toward universal health coverage in Myanmar: A national and subnational analysis

2021

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Background Universal health coverage (UHC) encompasses 2 main components: access to essential healthcare services and protection from financial hardship when using healthcare. This study examines Myanmar’s efforts to achieve UHC on a national and subnational level. It is a primer of studying the concept of UHC on a subnational level, and it also establishes a baseline for assessing future progress toward reaching UHC in Myanmar. Methods and findings The study uses the Demographic and Health Survey (2015) and the Myanmar Living Conditions Survey (MLCS; 2017) and adapts a previously developed UHC index to provide insights into the main barriers preventing the country’s progress toward UHC. We find a negative correlation between the UHC index and the state/region poverty levels. The equity of access analysis reveals significant pro-rich inequity in access to all essential healthcare services. Socioeconomic status and limited availability of healthcare infrastructure are the main driving forces behind the unequal access to interventions that are crucial to achieving UHC by 2030. Finally, financial risk protection analysis shows that the poor are less likely to use healthcare services, and, once they do, they are at a greater risk of suffering financial catastrophe. Limitations of this study revolve around its correlational, rather than causal, nature. Conclusions We suggest a 2-pronged approach to help Myanmar achieve UHC: Government and state authorities should reduce the financial burden of seeking healthcare, and, coupled with this, significant investment in and expansion of health infrastructure and the health workforce should be made, particularly in the poorer and more remote states.

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“…However, these plausible sources of military satisfaction may be offset by the greater separation of civilian and military institutions, which can increase fears of marginalization where militaries have had a larger governing role in living memory. Democracies also allocate a smaller percentage of their budgets toward defense spending (Albalate, Bel, & Elias, 2012; Bove & Nisticò, 2014) and it is not clear that the generals and high-level elites with the greatest capacity to organize coups are better off in democratic systems where transparency and institutionalization inhibit the private goods and rent-seeking enjoyed by those in non-democracies (see Slater, Smith, & Nair, 2014).…”

Section: Literature Review: Democratic Rule and The Causes Of Coup D’étatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coup d’État and Democracy

Bell

2016

Comparative Political Studies

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This article explains coup activity in democracies by adapting insights from the literature on commitment problems and framing coup around the threats leaders and potential coup plotters pose to each other. I claim democratic constraints on executive power inhibit a leader’s ability to repress threats from political rivals. Though this decreases motivations for coup attempts, it also makes democracies more vulnerable should a coup attempt occur. Consequently, democratic constraints on executive power do not reduce the frequency of coup attempts, but coups attempted against democracies are much more likely to succeed. Using several data sets of coup activity and democratic constraints, I find significant differences in coup activity in democracies and non-democracies. Relative to civilian non-democracies, democracies are about half as likely to use coup-related repression, but they face a similar frequency of coup attempts. Plots against democracies are nearly twice as likely to succeed.

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Coups d’état and defense spending: a counterfactual analysis

Cited by 43 publications

References 39 publications

Beyond coups: terrorism and military involvement in politics

Beyond coups: terrorism and military involvement in politics

Evaluation of progress toward universal health coverage in Myanmar: A national and subnational analysis

Coup d’État and Democracy

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