2013
DOI: 10.1177/0968344512454518
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Courage and Cowardice in the Roman Imperial Army

Abstract: This paper examines the courage and cowardice of Roman soldiers in the period from the late first century bc to the fourth century ad, set within a broader chronological context of service in standing armies. The specific sources for Roman warfare are evaluated together with features of service in the Roman armies. Discussion of courage is based on Roman concepts of virtus and disciplina, and examines religious and ritual observance, standing formations, regional cultural traditions, diet, medical support, tra… Show more

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Cited by 52 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Imperial soldiers were recruited into a professional army from across the empire, and many would have never seen Rome or the emperor. Local connections and loyalty to the army unit may have been more influential factors in the decision to serve (Phang, 2008;Coulston 2013). Rome itself, and other major cities of the empire, also became increasingly distant from the military and warfare.…”
Section: The Glorious Deadmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Imperial soldiers were recruited into a professional army from across the empire, and many would have never seen Rome or the emperor. Local connections and loyalty to the army unit may have been more influential factors in the decision to serve (Phang, 2008;Coulston 2013). Rome itself, and other major cities of the empire, also became increasingly distant from the military and warfare.…”
Section: The Glorious Deadmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Other recent work has provided some corrective for the traditional view, see Chrissanthos (2001) and 2014; Lendon (2006); Keaveney (2007); Phang (2008); Brice ( , 2011Brice ( , 2014; ; Coulston (2013). Not all of these correctives are of equal value as Lendon, Phang, Coulston, and Chrissanthos focused on discipline generally rather than indiscipline and achieved mixed results.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This aberrant pattern of resolving mutiniesChrissanthos (2001) identified as so common during instability and internal war that he considered it the norm instead of the aberration. See also andCoulston (2013).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%