Cournot and Bertrand equilibria compared: substitutability, complementarity and concavity

Amir, Rabah; Jin, Jim Y.

doi:10.1016/s0167-7187(99)00043-0

Cited by 79 publications

(76 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…First, U bargains with each D i over the terms of a two-part tari¤ contract, i.e., over a wholesale price, w i , and a …xed fee, after observing each other's contract terms. 5 2 An exception is Arya et al (2008) which similar to us …nd that Cournot competition results into more competitive and e¢ cient outcomes than Bertrand competition. However, the driving forces behind their results, as well as the model that they use are thoroughly di¤erent from ours: they consider a market consisting of a vertically integrated …rm and a non-integrated downstream rival.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 57%

Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market

2014

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editor. Cournot competition yields higher output, lower wholesale prices, lower …nal prices, higher consumers'surplus, and higher total welfare than Bertrand competition. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 57%

Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market

2014

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“…Subsequently, exploiting cost asymmetries, Dastidar [6], Qiu [17], Häckner [12], and Amir and Jin [1] have provided important counterexamples where at least one of these conclusions fails to hold. To date, however, the literature comparing Bertrand and Cournot outcomes has focused almost exclusively on environments where all firms maximize profits.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Unlike private firms, which maximize profits, a public firm maximizes welfare (sum of consumer surplus and profits). 1 We characterize and compare Cournot and Bertrand outcomes in a differentiated duopoly where a private firm competes against a welfare maximizing public firm (sections 2 and 3). The results are often strikingly different from the ones obtained in the standard setting which has only profit-maximizing firms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparing Bertrand and Cournot Outcomes in the Presence of Public Firms

Ghosh¹,

Mitra

2009

SSRN Journal

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“…Second, the paper extends to a context of imperfect and dispersed information the systematic comparison of price and quantity competition initiated by Singh and Vives (1984) for a differentiated duopoly with linear demand (recent contributions, also under perfect information, are provided by Jin, 2001, andAmir, Erickson andJin, 2017). In the same vein, we observe the development of a literature on the aggregation of private information in oligopolies with either demand or cost uncertainty 6 (Raith, 1996, Vives, 1988, 2011.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 63%