Courts and Power in Latin America and Africa

Courts, corruption and judicial independence

“…It tends to tick in when the stakes are high, such as when the executive or other power-holders feel their position threatened. It is thus particularly damaging for the courts' political accountability function, their ability to impartially enforce the rules of the political system, for example in relation to election fraud (Gloppen et al, 2004;Gloppen, 2010).…”

“…Rules of ratification or confirmation by parliament have often limited effect, particularly in dominant party contexts. In some cases the executive, like President Museveni in Uganda, has explicitly expressed intentions to 'appoint cadres to the bench' (Gloppen et al, 2004;Gloppen and Kazimbasi, 2008;Gloppen, 2010). In South Africa, some have interpreted ANC government officials as having a similar intention when they pursue the (otherwise legitimate) aim of 'transformation of the judiciary' (DA, 2007;Molele and Makinana, 2012).…”

“…The same is true where judges' promotion/demotion depend on being favoured by their superiors, and where the security of tenure in practice is weak. Formal rules to protect tenure may not be sufficient to allay judges' fears if experience show that they in practice risk losing their seat if they fall out of favour with the government, or when administrations change, as has been the case for example with supreme court judges in Argentina (Gloppen, 2010).…”

Ousted from the Bench? Judicial Departures in Consolidating Democracies

“…The latter could particularly be the case in systems where democratic values and processes are not institutionalised; where the government is not punished or monitored; and where corruption, weak party systems, and high electoral volatility prevail. Therefore, the set of incentives that political competition creates for politicians varies considerably according to the broader context (Popova 2012 Although some renowned works have compared courts in these two regions (Gloppen, Gargarella, and Skaar 2004;Gloppen et al 2010), most of the comparative research on judicial politics has been limited to a particular regional setting. 5 All six judicial systems have a Roman law background, although the Argentine system is in practice a mixed system (Helmke 2005: 176).…”

“…Despite these institutional differences, the courts in each of these countries have been granted considerable powers, thus making them a potential target for power holders (Gloppen et al 2010). Because the courts are empowered to revise or reverse political decisions, they become political actors that the elected branches may With this purpose in mind, we developed a strategy to distinguish due from undue departures.…”