2022
DOI: 10.1017/s0008423922000117
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COVID-19 and Support for Executive Aggrandizement

Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic offers a critical opportunity to assess the extent to which Canadians can be considered reliable defenders of democratic norms and institutions. In the face of such a serious threat to their physical and economic well-being, how willing are Canadians to condone the loosening of restraints on the power of the executive? This article addresses this question by drawing on the terror management and threat literatures. Combining a cross-sectional regression analysis with a vignette experiment … Show more

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Cited by 5 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…The federal government was called upon to produce dramatic, unprecedented economic supports, constrict international movement, disseminate public health information, frame the crisis for the Canadian public, and manage protective equipment and vaccine distribution in a complex federal system (Turnbull and Bernier, 2022; Paquet and Schertzer, 2020). The pandemic thus necessitated crisis and emergency modes of governance, which tend to reduce executive accountability to legislatures and encourage executive aggrandizement (Bolleyer and Salát, 2021; Brock, 2022; Gidengil et al, 2022; Turnbull and Bernier, 2022). As Turnbull and Bernier (2022) argue, a virtue of the Canadian Westminster executive in periods of crisis governance is its flexibility and inherent centralization.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The federal government was called upon to produce dramatic, unprecedented economic supports, constrict international movement, disseminate public health information, frame the crisis for the Canadian public, and manage protective equipment and vaccine distribution in a complex federal system (Turnbull and Bernier, 2022; Paquet and Schertzer, 2020). The pandemic thus necessitated crisis and emergency modes of governance, which tend to reduce executive accountability to legislatures and encourage executive aggrandizement (Bolleyer and Salát, 2021; Brock, 2022; Gidengil et al, 2022; Turnbull and Bernier, 2022). As Turnbull and Bernier (2022) argue, a virtue of the Canadian Westminster executive in periods of crisis governance is its flexibility and inherent centralization.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…legitimacy (e.g., Beetham 2012;Buchanan 2002;Caby & Frehen 2021;De Fine Licht et al 2014;Esaiasson et al 2012;Jackson et al 2012), the approaches to and concepts, strategies, policies, and measures of crisis management in general and specifically during the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., Ansel et al 2010;Christensen et al 2016;Christensen & Ma 2021;Rodríguez et al 2018), the roles of all branches of government, and particularly of legislation in crisis management processes (e.g., Bolleyer & Salát 2021; Chaplin 2020; Petrov 2020), democracy, the inclusion, integration and participation of citizens, citizens' perspectives on pandemic-related crisis management, and particularly on crisis management policies, measures, and their impacts and consequences (e.g., Alsan et al 2020, Bohle et al 2022Cronert 2022;Edgell et al 2021;Engler et al 2021;Gidengil et al 2022;Guasti & Bustikova 2022;Heinzel & Liese 2021;Lowande & Rogowski 2021;Lozano et al 2021;Maerz et al 2020;Mouter et al 2021;Rump & Zwiener-Collins 2021;Stasavage 2020).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%