Cracks in the Penal Harm Movement: Evidence From the Field*

Abstract

Research Summary For more than three decades, the penal harm movement, which involves “get tough” ideology and policies, has held sway over U.S. corrections. Scholars have justifiably detailed and decried this movement, but in so doing, they have also inadvertently contributed to the view that a punitive worldview is hegemonic. In contrast, we detail four major “cracks” in the penal harm movement's dominance: the persistence of rehabilitative public attitudes, the emergence of second thoughts about the wisdom of harsh sanctions, the implementation of progressive programs, and the increasing legitimacy of the principles of effective intervention for guiding correctional practices. Policy Implications Taken together, these “cracks” comprise evidence that ideological space and political will exist to fight the penal harm movement and to map out a more efficacious and progressive response to crime. Because of the persistence of social welfare sentiments and growing challenges to the legitimacy of “get tough” policies, the potential to continue, if not expand, this countermovement is present. Taking advantage of this opportunity, however, will require forfeiting the belief that there is no escape from a punitive future and undertaking systematic efforts to devise correctional strategies that are based on solid science, improve offenders' lives, and protect public safety.

A Decoupled System: Federal Criminal Justice and the Structural Limits of Transformation

“…A change is needed, and there are strong indications that it is occurring. Federal interest in smart on crime approaches (Department of Justice 2013b), excitement about promising state and local initiatives (Hawken and Kleiman 2009;Listwan et al 2008; National Institute of Corrections 2010), and enthusiasm for approaches related to procedural justice (Tyler 2010) and the justice reinvestment model (Clear 2011) all signal a shift in the way federal criminal justice work is done. Indeed, the move to operationalize evidence-based practices throughout the federal probation and pretrial services system is a landmark and will likely redefine community corrections for decades to come.…”

“…Even when judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel are willing to participate in reentry work, logistical issues of organizational responsibility, workload, funding, staff motivation, and skills training can undermine the implementation of key principles (Drug Courts Program Office 1997) and limit the impact of these professionals on recidivism rates (e.g., Lipsey and Cullen 2007). Nevertheless, the concept of offender reentry has attracted a great deal of attention within the federal criminal justice system (e.g., Department of Justice 2013b; Lattimore and Visher 2009;Listwan et al 2008;O'Hear 2007;Winterfield et al 2006); today, new techniques and tools are helping to reshape federal community corrections.…”

“…Because of overcrowding, however, Ohio needed to motivate counties not to send juveniles to state facilities. With the launch of an innovative program entitled RECLAIM (Reasoned and Equitable Community and Local Alternatives to the Incarceration of Minors), Ohio sought to reduce its use of juvenile commitments by expanding local jurisdictions' use of community-based alternatives (Listwan et al 2008). Before RECLAIM, counties could send an unlimited number of juveniles to state institutions but received no funds for communitybased alternatives.…”

Prisoner Reentry Programs

“…Second, political process theory emphasizes that movements are not possible without political opportunities. In part due to President George W. Bush's support of the Second Chance Act, reentry has enjoyed strong bipartisan support from Democrats and Republicans (Listwan et al 2008). The salience of reentry was heightened by the deep recession starting in 2008 that made the cost of mass imprisonment seem unsustainable and thus focused attention on ways to keep offenders from returning to prison.…”

Toward a systematic foundation for identifying evidence-based criminal justice sanctions and their relative effectiveness

“…The prominence of this shift can be seen in part by the change, in 2004, in the name of the U.S. General Accounting Office to the Government Accountability Office. As federal, state, and local governments have had to grapple with budget shortfalls due to a declining economy, the focus has assumed, if anything, greater urgency in recent years among those involved in designing, evaluating, overseeing, or implementing criminal justice policy (Drake et al, 2009;Lawrence, 2009;Listwan, Jonson, Cullen, & Latessa, 2008;Sherman, 2009;Spelman, 2009;Tonry, 2009;Welsh & Harris, 2008).…”