Crafting anti-corruption agencies’ bureaucratic reputation: an uphill battle

Abstract

The widespread implementation of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) has been an important public administration trend of the past decades. Considering the multifaceted challenges they face, much attention has been afforded to the legal structures which condition their bureaucratic autonomy. Little is known, however, about the reputational dimension of the autonomy of ACAs. This paper contributes a theoretical bridge between bureaucratic reputation theory and the anti-corruption literature, by studying how these agencies construct and manage their reputations over time. Using a mixedmethods research design, this paper employs a narrative analysis of commission hearings and semi-structured interviews, paired with quantitative content analysis of media articles and agency web-communications. The case of Quebec's (Canada) ACA shows the inherent challenges, strategies and non-linearity of reputation building, which enriches our understanding of the difficulty of crafting an agency's de facto bureaucratic autonomy.

Reputation core of Russian authorities: the case of the regional level of executive power

“…However, there is a noted lack of empirical research in this area [43]. The literature has explored numerous facets of reputation, such as reputational strategies in the policies of individual states [44], the application of the reputational approach to the study of European Union regulators [45], the management of reputations by anti-corruption agencies [46], the influence of reputation on the implementation of administrative policy control and accountability to representative bodies [47], the relationship between the effectiveness of anti-crisis communication strategies of public administration organizations and citizens' perception of their reputation [48], and the dependence of governmental institutions' reputation on the perception not only of the external but also internal audience, i. e., civil servants [49].…”

Building anti‐corruption agency collaboration and reputation: Hanging together or separately hanged

“…Although these issues have been highlighted, the literature has yet to cogently consolidate these scattered elements in a theoretical framework. Echoing recent studies, this paper proposes to transfer the four main reputational dimensions to the regulatory reality of ACAs (Tomic 2019; Bautista‐Beauchesne 2021). Performative : displaying the ability to produce intended outputs as well as accomplish goals and missions (i.e., effectively preventing and repressing corruption); Moral : showing the agency's high normative standards and organizational values (i.e., upholding anti‐corruption values such as integrity, honesty, transparency); Technical and Professional : projecting a competent and professional staff regardless of the difficult policy environment and context (i.e., adequately dealing with the intrinsic complexities of fighting corruption and white‐collar crime); Procedural : appropriately complying with bureaucratic procedures and legal barriers (i.e., respecting judicial limits and anti‐corruption jurisdictions).…”

“…ACAs often encounter institutional and jurisdictional hurdles, face adversarial interactions with the political sphere, and experience difficulties in acquiring cooperation from other public organizations (Meagher 2005;De Sousa 2009;Kuris 2015). Second, building institutional legitimacy and retaining public credibility has constituted an up-hill battle (Gong & Wang 2013;Scott & Gong 2015;Bautista-Beauchesne 2021).…”

“…ACAs often encounter institutional and jurisdictional hurdles, face adversarial interactions with the political sphere, and experience difficulties in acquiring cooperation from other public organizations (Meagher 2005; De Sousa 2009; Kuris 2015). Second, building institutional legitimacy and retaining public credibility has constituted an up‐hill battle (Gong & Wang 2013; Scott & Gong 2015; Bautista‐Beauchesne 2021). Often measured with whistleblowing denunciations, witness cooperation, or anti‐corruption awareness and activism, citizen trust remains crucial – yet elusive – for the effective implementation of prevention policies (Id.).…”