Creating an Efficient Culture of Cooperation

Abstract

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The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research

“…In Feld and Tyran (2002), the contribution rate is 71% when a formal non-deterrent punishment institution is chosen by the players and 38% when it is exogenously imposed. Similar results are provided by Bohnet and Kübler (2005), Tyran and Feld (2006), Grimm and Mengel (2009), Sutter et al (2010), Kamai et al (2015), Markussen et al (2014), and Fehr and Williams (2017). 12 However, there are also some studies that consider relatively weak institutions and still do not find a clear difference between the endogenous and the exogenous case.…”

“…Elinor Ostrom (1990) has argued that letting people choose their own institutions is better for cooperation than enforcing institutions from outside because the outside regulator may not have the incentive or ability to establish and enforce effective institutions. This possibility is absent in most of the surveyed studies (exceptions are Nicklisch et al 2016 andWilliams 2017) and deserves more attention. Many pressing cooperation problems involve tradeoffs, so comparing second-best institutions with one another may offer valuable insights.…”

“…Sutter et al (2010) test if subjects' social orientation can predict their voting decisions but they find no significant effect. Fehr and Williams (2017), on the other hand, find that prosocial subjects are more likely to join punishment institutions, especially at the beginning of the game when it is not yet common knowledge that these institutions lead to higher payoffs. Gallier (2017) measures in how far participants believe that they have control over events that affect their personal lives and relates this internal locus of control to their institutional choice.…”

“…In this section we describe if there are certain individual characteristics and attitudes that influence participants' decision to vote for or against enacting the institution. A common finding is that subjects with a strong cooperative inclination vote in favor of the institution (Dal Bó et al 2010;Ertan et al 2009;Mengel 2009, 2011;Weck-Hannemann 2003, 2004;Kocher et al 2016;Vollan et al 2017;Gallier 2017;Fehr and Williams 2017). Furthermore, subjects who have experienced very low levels of cooperation in the past are more likely to vote in favor of the institution (Bohnet and Kübler 2005;Barrett and Dannenberg 2017;Dal Bó et al 2010;Dannenberg et al 2019).…”

The Choice of Institutions to Solve Cooperation Problems: A Survey of Experimental Research

“…In this section we describe if there are certain individual characteristics and attitudes that influence participants' decision to vote for or against enacting the institution. A common finding is that subjects with a strong cooperative inclination vote in favor of the institution (Dal Bó et al, 2010;Ertan et al, 2009;Grimm and Mengel, 2009;Sutter and Weck-Hannemann, 2003;2004;Kocher et al, 2016;Vollan et al, 2017;Gallier, 2017;Fehr and Williams, 2017). Furthermore, subjects who have experienced very low levels of cooperation in the past are more likely to vote in favor of the institution (Bohnet and Kübler, 2005;Barrett and Dannenberg, 2017;Dal Bó et al, 2010;Dannenberg et al, 2019).…”