Creating trust in piranha-infested waters: The confluence of buyer, supplier and host country contexts

Zaheer, Akbar; Kamal, Darcy Fudge

doi:10.1057/jibs.2010.49

Cited by 44 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 24 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Similarly, cultural distance was also determined to be critical in understanding how justice-based governance practices impact the experience of conflict in buyer-supplier relationships (Srinivasan et al, 2018). It would be informative to extend our line of research to those involving buyer and supplier groups of different cultures in an inter-cultural examination (Zaheer and Kamal, 2011), which would require a substantially different line of theorizing beyond the scope of the current effort.…”

Section: Limitations and Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Effectiveness of bonus and penalty incentive contracts in supply chain exchanges: Does national culture matter?

Lee

Ribbink

Eckerd

2018

J of Ops Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this study, we investigate the impact of national culture on the effectiveness of bonus and penalty incentive contracts in supply chain exchanges. We conducted laboratory experiments in Canada, China, and South Korea, involving transactional exchanges in which suppliers were presented with either bonus or penalty contracts. Then we compared suppliers' contract acceptance, level of effort, and shirking across national cultures. Our findings reveal critical cultural influences on contract effectiveness. We show that although acceptance of bonus contracts is comparable across cultures, suppliers from Canada, a national culture considered low in power distance and high in humane orientation, exhibit lower acceptance rates of penalty contracts. In addition, we find evidence that suppliers associated with collectivist cultures exert more effort and shirk less in bonus contracts but these relationships also are more complex. When we compare contract effectiveness across bonus and penalty contracts within a given cultural setting, we find in all three countries greater acceptance of bonus contracts than penalty contracts. Also, after contracts are accepted, bonus contracts are more successful in China because suppliers exert greater effort and shirk less under bonus contracts than penalty contracts. However, in Canada and South Korea, the results of accepted contracts for both penalty and bonus contracts are nearly indistinguishable.

show abstract

Section: Limitations and Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Effectiveness of bonus and penalty incentive contracts in supply chain exchanges: Does national culture matter?

Lee

Ribbink

Eckerd

2018

J of Ops Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…A partner that encourages group identity fosters a greater sense of cooperation. This is particularly true in instances where stakeholders may have competing or conflicting expectations regarding the group norms (Zaheer and Fudge Kamal ). UNICEF unilaterally created a shared identity with the local communities and businesses to provide iodized salt (Gulati ).…”

Section: Resolving Public‐private Partnerships Social Dilemmasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recognizing and Resolving Social Dilemmas in Supply Chain Public–Private Partnerships

McCarter

Kamal

2013

J of Business Logistics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

T he public-private partnership (PPP) is a popular strategy for creating global sustainable value. However, many PPPs struggle to realize their value-added potential. Why do some public-private partnerships succeed while others fail, and how may those struggling succeed? Combining supply-chain integration and social dilemma perspectives into the conversation of PPPs, we examine the dynamics and psychology of cooperation necessary for PPP success. Addressing the first part of our research question, we recognize three social dilemmas that can manifest while managing PPP supply chains: a give-some dilemma, a take-some dilemma, and a give-or-take-some dilemma. To address the second part of our research question, we present a taxonomy of strategies resolving these PPP social dilemmas through the enhancement of trust, selfefficacy, and social responsibility. We discuss implications for PPPs, supply-chain, and social dilemma literatures.

show abstract

“…Yet such a conjecture has not been adequately tested. Furthermore, with few exceptions (e.g., Katsikeas, Skarmeas, & Bello, 2009), this literature has mainly examined domestic interfirm relationships either in the United States or in other countries, but research has not been conducted in a cross-national setting, where exchange parties come from different institutional contexts with different rules of the game (Zaheer & Kamal, 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How foreign firms curtail local supplier opportunism in China: Detailed contracts, centralized control, and relational governance

2012

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

An ongoing debate in the interfirm exchange literature concerns whether economic and social governance mechanisms function as substitutes or complements. We advance a more nuanced approach to examining how detailed contracts and centralized control interact with relational governance differentially in curbing local supplier opportunism in emerging markets. We suggest that where legal institutions are weak, detailed contracts are ineffective in containing partner opportunism in contractually specified areas. Under such circumstances, relational governance provides a proxy for legal institutions to ensure contract execution. Meanwhile, relational governance serves as an alternative mechanism to centralized control for ensuring contingency adaptations. Based on a sample of 168 foreign buyer-local supplier exchanges in China, we find that relational governance complements detailed contracts but substitutes for centralized control in curtailing opportunism. Therefore foreign firms must be cautious in their combinative use of social and economic mechanisms in governing exchanges with local suppliers in emerging markets.

show abstract

Creating trust in piranha-infested waters: The confluence of buyer, supplier and host country contexts

Cited by 44 publications

References 24 publications

Effectiveness of bonus and penalty incentive contracts in supply chain exchanges: Does national culture matter?

Effectiveness of bonus and penalty incentive contracts in supply chain exchanges: Does national culture matter?

Recognizing and Resolving Social Dilemmas in Supply Chain Public–Private Partnerships

How foreign firms curtail local supplier opportunism in China: Detailed contracts, centralized control, and relational governance

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About