Innovation sustainability requires sustainable financing. Extensive research suggests that debt is a disfavored source of innovation financing. In this study, we show that a recent financial development, credit default swaps (CDSs), may change the institutional logics of debt, making debt useful to the financing innovation. To be specific, we find that with CDS protection, creditors become less concerned with a borrowing firm’s credit risk and risk taking, making debt tolerant of early failures and reducing the negative impact of debt on the process of Innovation. In addition, we find that the availability of CDSs is more likely to change the nature of long-term debt than that of short-term debt, making long-term debt a useful instrument for the financing of innovation. Finally, the mitigation effect of CDS on the relation between debt and innovation is more pronounced for CDS firms with higher pay sensitivity to stock price volatility (Vega) and less financial constraints, revealing that a CEO’s incentive, rather than the relaxed financing constraints, is the underlying channel for the reduced negative impact of debt on innovation after CDS trading.