Credit offering strategy and dynamic pricing in the presence of consumer strategic behavior

Zha, Yong; Wang, Yuting; Li, Quan; Yao, Wenying

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2022.03.023

Cited by 12 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…Liu et al (2019) examine dynamic pricing versus advance commitment pricing for multigeneration product upgrades, finding advance commitment pricing to be superior when product innovation value is low. Regarding other issues, Zha et al (2022) explore platform consumer credit and pricing strategy design; Li et al (2020) examine coupon redemption strategies; Wu et al (2022) study firms' optimal pricing strategy choices. These studies provide important insights into how consumer behavior influences firms' optimal pricing strategies.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Limited‐time pricing strategy considering consumer regret under channel competition

Yu,

Guo,

Cheng

et al. 2024

Manage Decis Econ

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This study constructs a pricing strategy model that considers consumer busyness and low price duration to examine the effectiveness of limited‐time pricing in influencing consumer behavior. The results show that local store can develop a limited‐time promotion strategy to improve profit, and there is an optimal low price duration. As consumer busyness increases, online retailer's profit may decrease, as local store is better able to leverage consumer busyness to enhance competitiveness. Interestingly, when local store lower price, online retailer may actually need to increase price to obtain greater profit from consumers who missed out on store discounts.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Limited‐time pricing strategy considering consumer regret under channel competition

Yu,

Guo,

Cheng

et al. 2024

Manage Decis Econ

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“…The regulation of the algorithmic price discrimination behaviour of e-commerce platforms is a dynamic and continuous process with multiple influencing factors [18]. Evolutionary games believe that the subject of the game is limited and rational and can effectively analyse the influencing factors in the decision-making process, continuously learn and improve the game strategy [19,20], and finally approach the equilibrium state [21].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Regulation of Algorithmic Price Discrimination Behaviour of E-Commerce Platform Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game

Yang

2023

Sustainability

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With the development of the digital economy, the algorithms and big data technologies of e-commerce platforms have gradually turned into double-edged swords. While realising personalised recommendations, they also provide information technology support for the use of algorithmic prices to discriminate and extract residual value from consumers. Consumers frequently use Black Cat and third-party media to complain, resulting in a significant negative impact. Therefore, in order to regulate algorithmic price discrimination, using e-commerce platforms, local governments and consumers act as game subjects, taking an evolutionary game approach. We analyse the impact of different situations and factors on the system’s evolutionary stability strategy and conduct its verification via simulation experiments. This study shows that several measures, such as increasing cooperation with the media; establishing clear regulatory rules to reduce the extent of algorithmic price discrimination and the grey revenue of e-commerce platforms; establishing a long-term mechanism for consumer feedback; improving rewards and punishments to increase the probability of successful regulation and penalties by local governments; sharing information to reduce the cost of consumer regulation; and setting reasonable bonus thresholds based on government revenue and consumer regulation costs, can effectively regulate algorithmic price discrimination and promote the sustainable development of e-commerce platforms.

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Impacts of supply chain leadership on dynamic pricing under consumer patience information asymmetry

Wang,

Ma,

Xia

et al. 2024

Manage Decis Econ

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As the online market rapidly develops, firms will face strategic consumers who differ in buying times. Given that the leadership structure in supply chains affects the chain members' decision‐making and performance, we study this impact in a two‐period dynamic pricing setting with an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer, where the patience degree of consumers is the retailer's private information. We examine two leadership scenarios: retailer dominance and manufacturer dominance. The two members play a signaling game under retailer dominance, whereas the manufacturer can only set its wholesale price based on its prior belief under manufacturer dominance. Our analysis indicates that when consumers are more patient, the retailer tends to share its private information with the manufacturer under retailer dominance to avoid the reduction of its retail margin and enhance its profitability. However, the retailer may keep the consumers' patience information private when the manufacturer dominates the supply chain because the manufacturer will set a compromised wholesale price and passively cede profits to the retailer. Finally, we examine consumer surplus and social welfare. We demonstrate that retailer dominance is the Pareto optimal strategy.

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Credit offering strategy and dynamic pricing in the presence of consumer strategic behavior

Cited by 12 publications

References 54 publications

Limited‐time pricing strategy considering consumer regret under channel competition

Limited‐time pricing strategy considering consumer regret under channel competition

Research on the Regulation of Algorithmic Price Discrimination Behaviour of E-Commerce Platform Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game

Impacts of supply chain leadership on dynamic pricing under consumer patience information asymmetry

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