2018
DOI: 10.1111/fire.12149
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Credit Ratings and Managerial Voluntary Disclosures

Abstract: This study investigates whether managers influence credit ratings via voluntary disclosures. I find that firms near a rating change have a higher incidence of a disclosure regarding product and business expansion (PBE) plans. This finding is more evident for firms that are subject to lower proprietary costs of disclosures, which implies that managers do trade off both the benefits and costs of the disclosures. I find no evidence that firms close to a rating change selectively release good news or suppress bad … Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
3
2

Citation Types

2
21
0

Year Published

2019
2019
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
4
2

Relationship

4
2

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 15 publications
(23 citation statements)
references
References 72 publications
(107 reference statements)
2
21
0
Order By: Relevance
“…If both conditions hold, we expect to find a positive association between PBE disclosures and analyst forecast informativeness. Our results support this prediction, which is consistent with and complements two strands of literature which shows that (i) PBE disclosures are value-relevant (Nichols 2010;He 2018) and that (ii) analysts are more sophisticated than investors in processing information (e.g., Chandra et al 1999, Rajgopal et al 2003. We do not find evidence that additional disclosures of PBE information increase or decrease analyst forecast errors.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 91%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…If both conditions hold, we expect to find a positive association between PBE disclosures and analyst forecast informativeness. Our results support this prediction, which is consistent with and complements two strands of literature which shows that (i) PBE disclosures are value-relevant (Nichols 2010;He 2018) and that (ii) analysts are more sophisticated than investors in processing information (e.g., Chandra et al 1999, Rajgopal et al 2003. We do not find evidence that additional disclosures of PBE information increase or decrease analyst forecast errors.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 91%
“…Various nonfinancial information disclosures are potentially value-relevant. Most such disclosures are made on a voluntary basis, covering issues such as corporate social responsibility (e.g., Dhaliwal et al 2011, Dhaliwal et al 2012, Cormier and Magnan 2014, corporate environmental policies (e.g., Beets andSouther 1999, Aerts et al 2008), customer relationship (e.g., Luo et al 2010, Ngobo et al 2012, intellectual capital (e.g., Hsu and Chang 2011), research and development expenditures (e.g., Barron et al 2002, Jones 2007, Xu et al 2007, and product and business expansion plans (e.g., Nichols 2010, He 2018. Evidence suggests that corporate nonfinancial disclosures can affect analyst forecast decisions (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1996, Aerts et al 2008, Simpson 2010.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Publicly released risk disclosures matter for credit rating agencies for two main reasons (He, 2018). First, publicly disclosed risk information is subject to scrutiny from both external investors and legal agencies.…”
Section: Literature Review: Theory Empirics and Research Hypotheses mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In such a sense, the publicly released disclosures are more credible than private communications (e.g., Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010; Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004). He (2018) finds that managers possess no legal accountability for privately circulating incorrect or misleading information to BCR agencies. Second, publicly released risk information could impact the anticipated value of a company's future cash flow over forming and/or changing market expectations.…”
Section: Literature Review: Theory Empirics and Research Hypotheses mentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation