2016
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12426
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Credit Rationing, Income Exaggeration, and Adverse Selection in the Mortgage Market

Abstract: We examine the role of borrower concerns about future credit availability in mitigating the effects of adverse selection and income misrepresentation in the mortgage market. We show that the majority of additional risk associated with “low‐doc” mortgages originated prior to the Great Recession was due to adverse selection on the part of borrowers who could verify income but chose not to. We provide novel evidence that these borrowers were more likely to inflate or exaggerate their income. Our analysis suggests… Show more

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Cited by 70 publications
(29 citation statements)
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“…The previous result suggests that recent regulatory changes may have unintended consequences, resulting in less accessible credit for some borrowers and higher housing rents. Ambrose, Conklin and Yoshida (2016) present findings that point in the same direction. On the other hand, the tighter lending standards may also correct the excessively lax standards during the housing boom.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 70%
“…The previous result suggests that recent regulatory changes may have unintended consequences, resulting in less accessible credit for some borrowers and higher housing rents. Ambrose, Conklin and Yoshida (2016) present findings that point in the same direction. On the other hand, the tighter lending standards may also correct the excessively lax standards during the housing boom.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 70%
“…Piskorski et al (2015) use New Century data to confirm that lenders were aware of second-lien misreporting by showing that 93.3% of New Century loans with unreported second liens had records of second liens in New Century's internal data. 12 Ambrose et al (2016) use New Century data to study income misreporting. Conklin et al (2020) use New Century data to study appraisal inflation.…”
Section: New Century Samplementioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to Bernanke and Gertler (1995) it materialises as an external finance premium (the difference between the cost of external funds and the opportunity cost of internal funds), which reflects the cost associated with the agency dilemma. This problem persists particularly in the mortgage scheme which typically involves high uncertainty by its nature (Ambrose et al 2016).…”
Section: Credit Channelsmentioning
confidence: 99%