2008
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006
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Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment

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Cited by 825 publications
(992 citation statements)
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References 33 publications
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“…Fourth, in follow-up experiments one might collect data for additional variables such as legal culpability or deserved punishment. This would shed light on whether outcome severity does in fact have the assumed effect on punishment (as data for laypeople reported by Cushman (2008) suggests) and whether the impact is indeed mediated by choice of mens rea type. Fifth, while we have focused exclusively on intentionality, the problematic extends to other types of mens rea that are commonly distinguished in criminal law (cf.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 89%
“…Fourth, in follow-up experiments one might collect data for additional variables such as legal culpability or deserved punishment. This would shed light on whether outcome severity does in fact have the assumed effect on punishment (as data for laypeople reported by Cushman (2008) suggests) and whether the impact is indeed mediated by choice of mens rea type. Fifth, while we have focused exclusively on intentionality, the problematic extends to other types of mens rea that are commonly distinguished in criminal law (cf.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 89%
“…Previous research suggests there are important differences between judgements about acts being wrong/inappropriate and judgments about individuals as blameworthy/deserving of punishment (e.g. Cushman 2008;O'Hara et al 2010). So, while other judgments may concern ethics or morality (e.g.…”
Section: Search Criteriamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In general, intentional harms are judged more harshly than unintentional harms (Cushman, 2008;Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & Carey, 2013;Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007). Intention-based moral evaluations and third party preferences are early developmental facts, observable in babies younger than 12 months (Hamlin, 2013;Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007;Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Pawson, 2009).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%