Critical Remarks on the Cognitive Science of Religion

Abstract

Cognitive explanations of religious beliefs propose an evolutionary past in which humans had to possess certain cognitive adaptations to survive. The aim of this article is to show that some cognitive accounts may overvalue the putative role of cognition. One such cognitive idea is an assumption that cognition has been evolutionarily shaped only, or most importantly, in the Pleistocene. This idea seems common among writers on the cognitive science of religion (CSR), but is mistaken. Cognition has been shaped throughout evolution. Another idea is that components of religion could not have been produced by natural selection (the hypothesis that religion is a by-product). But the article suggests that there are some domains in the field of religion and religious components that could be acquired and transmitted despite or even against alleged cognitive biases. The aim of this article is to argue for an extended approach that combines a cognitive account with functional naturalistic approaches, including an adaptationist one. Such distinction could imply that cognition is not functional. Obviously, this is not the case since cognition is the process of knowing, and surely knowledge is functional. However, the main argument for such a distinction lies in the key idea of the cognitive account that as far as cognition is functional and adaptive, religious components are not. Functionalism or "adaptivism" concerning cognition contradicts functionalism concerning religion. Numbers of scholars who consider themselves part of CSR seem also to consider both cognition and religion adaptive. However, in regard to components of religion, their adaptive, functional power is only Konrad Szocik is Assistant Professor at

A Framework of Spirituality for the Future of Naturalism

“…As such, the FOS is not itself identified as a “naturalism” but is an explanation and process that can be accommodated by naturalism as well as other religious traditions. It is recognized that in some discussions within religious naturalism, the nature of “supernatural,” or the nature of “God” becomes a question of definition (Stone 2017; Szocik 2020) yet to be determined.…”

“…Therefore, descriptions in the FOS, as in most religious naturalism, refer to "attributes" of experience that are common to usual experiences associated with the divine, transcendent reality and God as presented earlier by Goodenough. Very specifically, this is not the spirituality as noted by Szocik (2020) in his "Critical Remarks on the Cognitive Science of Religion," whereby he relegates spirituality to "belief in spirits or disembodied persons. "…”