Critical Space Infrastructures

Georgescu, Alexandru; Gheorghe, Adrian V.; Piso, Marius-Ioan; Katina, Polinpapilinho F.

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-12604-9_2

Cited by 3 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…for any given sets a S and . et al, 2009;Georgescu et al, 2019), the timing risk at ith receiver, which is denoted by , ,…”

Section: Timing Risk Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is equally important to quantify the risk associated with the estimated timing. While there are different ways (Georgescu et al, 2019;Ochieng et al, 2003) to quantify risk, for this work, we define risk as the probability of an estimation error that exceeds a safety alert limit (AL). For instance, claiming that the estimated timing is 1 s µ accurate does not suffice, unless this is accompanied by a certain risk, say 3 10 .…”

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confidence: 99%

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GPS Spoofing Mitigation and Timing Risk Analysis in Networked Phasor Measurement Units via Stochastic Reachability

Bhamidipati

Gao

2023

navi

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Modern power systems analyze real-time grid stability using a widely-dispersed network of advanced devices known as phasor measurement units (PMUs) (Al-Hammouri et al., 2012). As per the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, more than 2500 PMUs were deployed across North America as of March 2015 (Tholomier et al., 2009). Figure 1 shows a map of the dense network of these spatially-distributed PMUs (Dagle, 2018). The North American synchrophasor initiative network (NASPInet), which is a collaborative effort by the United States Department of Energy and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, provides a secure and decentralized infrastructure for communication among the PMUs (Myrda & Koellner, 2010). Each PMU is equipped with a Global Positioning

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“…for any given sets a S and . et al, 2009;Georgescu et al, 2019), the timing risk at ith receiver, which is denoted by , ,…”

Section: Timing Risk Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

GPS Spoofing Mitigation and Timing Risk Analysis in Networked Phasor Measurement Units via Stochastic Reachability

Bhamidipati

Gao

2023

navi

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“…The U.S. national interest in space has grown with the reliance and dependence on technological capabilities regarding communications, remote sensing, global positioning/navigation, broadband, and entertainment. As Georgescu et al state, 90% of military communications are transmitted and routed through civilian satellite systems (Georgescu et al, 2019). This reliance by the U.S. military on civilian communication satellites and the U.S. infrastructure consisting of more satellites than any other state inevitably increases vulnerability.…”

Section: The Threat Of Space Weapons To Space Logisticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A space-faring nation with significantly more satellites in orbit than other states could be viewed as threatening space dominance. As Georgescu et al explain, "this dependency breeds vulnerability, both to natural and man-made risks arising from the specific environment in which space systems operate, as well as to deliberate attacks seeking to destabilize societies" (Georgescu et al 2019).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Una nación espacial con significativamente más satélites en órbita que otros estados podría verse como una amenaza para el dominio del espacio. Como Georgescu et al explican, "esta dependencia genera vulnerabilidad, tanto a los riesgos naturales como provocados por el hombre que surgen del entorno específico en el que operan los sistemas espaciales, así como a los ataques deliberados que buscan desestabilizar las sociedades" (Georgescu et al 2019).…”

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Could Redefining US Space Power Mitigate the Risk of Space Logistics Degradation by the Threat of Space Weaponization?

Gulmesoff¹

2021

sesa

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This research article aims to assess U.S. space logistics and the threat of space weapons through the lens of proposed theories and concepts of space power. This analysis will begin with a brief introduction to space logistics, followed by the threat of space weapons, address concepts of space power, and end with recommendations and a new theory of space power. To this day, more states are gaining access to the space domain and challenging U.S. space dominance. As Smith suggests, the U.S. has been more focused on tracking objects in orbit instead of protecting space assets and deterring adversaries (M. V. Smith 2002). While the space treaties of the 1960s and 1970s attempted to establish the peaceful use of the space domain, preventing outer space's weaponization, its effectiveness has slowly declined over the decades with changes to global, national security objectives and technology advancements.Advanced societies rely on the critical space infrastructure (CSI) for daily life to include supporting economies and government systems. From the day CSI's were established in the space domain, their technology has vastly improved to provide better services. Even though the expansion and reliance have enhanced technological capabilities with communications, remote sensing, global positioning/navigation, broadband, and entertainment, it has also exposed vulnerabilities. In 2016 the U.S. had 576 satellites in orbit while China had 181, and Russia had 140 (Johnson-Freese, 2016). A space-faring nation with significantly more satellites in orbit than other states could be viewed as threatening space dominance. As Georgescu et al. explain, "this dependency breeds vulnerability, both to natural and man-made risks arising from the specific environment in which space systems operate, as well as to deliberate attacks seeking to destabilize societies" (Georgescu et al. 2019).

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Construction cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection: new horizons for Construction 4.0

Soto¹,

Georgescu²,

Mantha³

et al. 2022

ITcon

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One of the key concepts of Construction 4.0 is cyber-physical systems. The construction industry is increasingly creating valuable digital assets, but it is also gradually using digital technology to plan, design, build, monitor, and control the physical ones. This makes construction sites and operations vulnerable to cyber-attacks. While the damage to digital assets can have financial implications, attacks on digitally-controlled physical assets may impact people’s well-being and, in worst-case scenarios, result in casualties. The problem is amplified by the emerging cyber-physical nature of the systems, where the human checks may be left out. The construction industry could draw inspiration from the work done in critical infrastructures (CI). Construction is the prelude of any socio-technical asset tagged as a CI. While most assets may not be critical in the CI sense, they are essential to a business’ operations and the people directly or indirectly associated with them. This study presents a literature review on the previous CI protection (CIP) efforts and construction cybersecurity studies to show their synergy. Recommendations based on well-established CIP processes to make construction more cyber-secure are provided. It is expected that this study will create awareness about cybersecurity practices within the construction industry. Ongoing work includes understanding where construction stands and developing a framework to address cybersecurity throughout the different project phases.

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Critical Space Infrastructures

Cited by 3 publications

References 16 publications

GPS Spoofing Mitigation and Timing Risk Analysis in Networked Phasor Measurement Units via Stochastic Reachability

GPS Spoofing Mitigation and Timing Risk Analysis in Networked Phasor Measurement Units via Stochastic Reachability

Could Redefining US Space Power Mitigate the Risk of Space Logistics Degradation by the Threat of Space Weaponization?

Construction cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection: new horizons for Construction 4.0

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