Critique and reformulation of "learning-theory" approaches to psychotherapy and neurosis.

Theoretical Implications of Imagery and Fantasy Techniques

“…Indeed, it is possible to conceive of using modeling* or even opérant conditioning techniques for training persons, specially children, in improved use of imagery for play (Freyberg, 1970;Gottlieb, 1968), or for more effective use of imagery in learning tasks as well for effective functioning in psychotherapy. Breger and McGaugh (1965) have suggested some telling criticisms of the theoretical underpinnings of the so-called learning or conditioning methods and have proposed that some cognitive or conscious factors may also account for some of the undoubtedly good results. Images and fantasies are not static; during the ten or fifteen seconds a patient may be trying to sustain an image of a frightening scene, he may also think 'Behavior therapy usually involves some form, singly or in combination, of desensitization (Lazarus, 1960;Paul, 1967;Wolpe, 1958;Garfield, McBrearty, and Dichter, 1969), aversive conditioning (Marks and Gelder, 1967;McGuire, Carlisle, and Young, 1965), implosion (Hogan and Kirchner, 1968;Stampfl and Leavis, 1970) or symbolic modelling (Homme, 1965).…”

Comment on the Status of Systematic Desensitization

“…Wolpe, 1976Wolpe, , 1989. From the very beginning of the behavior therapy movement there was criticism of "stimulusresponse psychology" as providing adequate organizing principles for psychological therapy as well as argument that cognitive factors deserved a prominent theoretical role (see especially Breger & McGaugh, 1965). Early on, the approaches to therapy that were developed by people such as Ellis (1962) and Meichenbaum (1975) became popular competitors to behavior therapy in some arenas.…”

Authoritarian Trends in Contemporary Psychology: The Dominance of the Paradigm

“…Clearly, this would imply that only scientific knowledge is real and, indirectly, that only those people capable of abstract thought are capable of knowing rea1icy.l If there is a belief that scientific languages are fundamental, then it is of little surprise to find that in the world of psychological paradigms, each paradigm believes in its own validity. Recent arguments by Breger and McGaugh ( 1965), by Chomsky ( 1959), by Rachman and Eysenck ( 1966), and by Wiest (1967), all show strong conviction of their own correctness. This may be a result of a framework of academic discussion which demands firm conviction, it is nevertheless true, however, that little room is left for doubt.…”