Cross-agreement retaliation in the WTO dispute settlement system: an important enforcement mechanism for developing countries?

Spadano, Lucas Eduardo F. A.

doi:10.1017/s1474745608003960

Cited by 21 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…Lawrence discusses his views on the trade penalty regime and gives the rationale for government responses to WTO rule violations [2], as well as specific practical mechanisms and recommendations for reform [2]. Spadano analyzes the link between cross-retaliation and developing countries and states that developing countries should use the cross-retaliation system to achieve effective retaliation against developed countries [3]. Limenta explores the effectiveness of the retaliation regime and the objectives of the regime from three perspectives [4], especially about the objectives of the regime.…”

Section: Studies On the Retaliation Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Retaliation System in the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism

Zheng

2023

LNEP

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When conducting trade activities, due to the needs of countries' national interests or due to the general international context, it is inevitable that some acts will be used to disrupt the balance of world trade transactions, thus causing conflicts between two or more nations. If a dispute arises under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement, one party will be deemed to be in breach of the WTO agreement, and the injured party will resort to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body(DSB), and if the "losing party" does not fulfill the agreement, then the "winning party" will request the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to retaliate against it. If the "losing party" does not fulfill the agreement, then the "winning party" will request the DSB to authorize retaliation against it, to stop the behavior of the defaulting party and get certain compensation. Therefore, the retaliation system of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is of great significance to maintaining the international economic order. The establishment of this system is of great practical significance for resolving disputes between disputing parties and achieving the rebalancing of the international economic order. However, along with the continuous occurrence of various dispute cases, and in the increasingly frequent use of the WTO panel members, member states and academics have gradually recognized certain shortcomings of the retaliation system, resulting in this system for certain violations of the agreement, often helpless. In this regard, all countries have improved the retaliation system under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism from their own or overall interests. This paper discusses the shortcomings of the retaliation system in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and then makes some suggestions on how to modify and improve it.

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Section: Studies On the Retaliation Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Retaliation System in the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism

Zheng

2023

LNEP

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“…In terms of research on specific issues, Reference [12] conducts a systematic legal and economic analysis based on the arbitration report of the US-Highland cotton subsidy case and points out the current difficulties and problems of WTO retaliation. Reference [13] discusses the nature and principles of cross-retaliation in combination with the EC-Bananas III case, the US-Gambling case, and the US-Upland Cotton case; analyzes the dilemma in practice; and puts forward suggestions to strengthen the supervision of the enforcement of the ruling and the combination of cross-retaliation. Reference [14] explains the provisions and principles of Article 22.3 of the DSU on choosing the form of retaliation and the analysis of the determination of infeasibility or invalidity, and the situation is serious enough in arbitration with reference to cases.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effect Evaluation of WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism Based on Artificial Neural Network

2022

Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing

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In today’s rapid economic development, trade exchanges between countries are increasingly close, and there are inevitable trade frictions that follow as a consequence. The World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) has become a predominant choice to deal with trade frictions for majority of the WTO member states. As part of the process of applying the Sino-US trade friction to the WTO DSM, the rise of US trade protectionism has caused serious damage to the WTO DSM. Also, the DSM similarly exposes its own inherent defects. Hence, the research on improvement of the WTO DSM under the background of trade friction has profound practical value. Based on this background, this paper proposes a framework for the effective evaluation of WTO DSM based on the artificial neural network. The contributions of the paper include the following: (1) Introduction of domestic and foreign scholars’ research on different issues in the WTO DSM, wherein the retaliation mechanism is introduced in detail. Also, it is conducive for further deepening of the purpose and significance of the retaliation system in the WTO DSM. (2) The characteristics and structure of the CNN are introduced, and a suitable evaluation system for analyzing the impact of WTO DSM is constructed. Further, an evaluation model based on the CNN is proposed. (3) As per the dimension principle of CNN interlayer calculation, the network structure parameters are selected considering an optimal comprehensive evaluation index of the network. The results verify the effectiveness of the proposed method. Finally, when compared with the other state-of-the-art network models, it is found that CNN generates the highest evaluation accuracy.

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“…Typically, for a small-market country seeking to retaliate against an economically powerful country, trade sanctions often result in 'shooting oneself in the foot' (i.e., in the form of increased import prices) while inflicting little economic harm -and hence, retaliatory pressureon the offending party. 155 Retaliation in the area of trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS), as opposed to goods and services, may help mitigating the first of these shortcomings, 156 but its potential in exerting pressure on the defaulting party will ultimately depend on the market size of the retaliating country. In WTO practice, this has been illustrated by the relatively successful experience of a large developing country (i.e., Brazil in US -Upland Cotton) and the unsuccessful attempt of a small developing country (i.e., Antigua in US -Gambling) in cross-retaliating under the TRIPS Agreement against the United States.…”

Section: Moving Towards Sanction-based Enforcement?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Sustainable development chapters in EU free trade agreements: Emerging compliance issues

Durán¹

2020

COLA

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In recent years we have seen an intensified interest in the EU’s“Trade and Sustainable Development” chapters, which represent its efforts to develop a distinct promotional model for regulating trade-environment and trade-labour linkages in free trade agreements. This article deals with the implementation and enforcement of TSD provisions and, in so doing, draws attention to compliance by the EU (and its Member States). It explores the question of who is responsible on the EU side for the due performance of TSD commitments, with the answer being even less clear following Opinion 2/15 conerning the EU-Singapore FTA. The article revisits the case for a harder sanctions-based enforcement of TSD chapters and argues that this is not warranted from an effectiveness standpoint, and is unwanted on equity and other grounds.

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Cross-agreement retaliation in the WTO dispute settlement system: an important enforcement mechanism for developing countries?

Cited by 21 publications

References 35 publications

Research on the Retaliation System in the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism

Research on the Retaliation System in the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism

Effect Evaluation of WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism Based on Artificial Neural Network

Sustainable development chapters in EU free trade agreements: Emerging compliance issues

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