2021
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2020.100820
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Cross-border effects of prudential regulation: Evidence from the euro area

Abstract: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz … Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The coefficients of capital‐aimed macroprudential policies are both significant and positive, indicating that this type of macroprudential policy per se is ineffective in lowering banks' risk. This supports the findings of Laeven and Levine (2009) and Franch et al (2021) and the theory that managers will adapt to a tighter macroprudential framework by shifting banks' investments toward riskier assets, thereby increasing banks' risk.…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 87%
“…The coefficients of capital‐aimed macroprudential policies are both significant and positive, indicating that this type of macroprudential policy per se is ineffective in lowering banks' risk. This supports the findings of Laeven and Levine (2009) and Franch et al (2021) and the theory that managers will adapt to a tighter macroprudential framework by shifting banks' investments toward riskier assets, thereby increasing banks' risk.…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 87%
“…21 An important subset of the literature has also explored unintended consequences of bank capital regulation as well as interactions with other forms of banking regulation, particularly liquidity requirements (Boissay and Collard, 2016;Faia, 2019;De Nicolo et al, 2014) and monetary policy (Gambacorta and Murcia, 2019;De Jonghe et al, 2019;Eickmeier et al, 2018;Meeks, 2017;Takats and Temesvary, 2019;Uluc and Wieladek, 2018). Other considerations are effects on banking competition (Corbae and D'Erasmo, 2019), liquidity in repo and other financial markets (Van Horen and Kotidis, 2018;Boissay et al, 2018;Haselmann et al, 2019;Cenedese et al, 2019), cross-border spillovers (Franch et al, 2019;Takats and Temesvary, 2019), risk-taking (Martynova et al, 2019) and portfolio rebalancing away from risky (but potentially productive) lending towards safer assets (bonds or household mortgages) (Cohen and Scatigna, 2016;Ambrocio and Jokivuolle, 2017;Juelsrud and Wold, 2018;Gropp et al, 2019;Mayordomo and Rodriguez-Moreno, 2018), the non-price terms of credit contracts (Mayordomo et al, 2019), and shift in intermediation towards shadow banks (Irani et al, 2018). Gehrig and Iannino (2018) find evidence which suggests that the introduction of internal credit risk models in regulation may have led to increased exposures to systemic risk.…”
Section: Effects Of Capital Requirementsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…abroad, showing that tighter restrictions on bank activities in home jurisdictions are associated with greater risk-taking by banks abroad in the form of lower lending standards. According to the findings in Franch et al (2019), domestic banks reduce lending after a tightening of capital requirements in other countries, while foreign subsidiaries increase lending following the tightening of sector-specific capital buffers in the country of the parent bank.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%