“…21 An important subset of the literature has also explored unintended consequences of bank capital regulation as well as interactions with other forms of banking regulation, particularly liquidity requirements (Boissay and Collard, 2016;Faia, 2019;De Nicolo et al, 2014) and monetary policy (Gambacorta and Murcia, 2019;De Jonghe et al, 2019;Eickmeier et al, 2018;Meeks, 2017;Takats and Temesvary, 2019;Uluc and Wieladek, 2018). Other considerations are effects on banking competition (Corbae and D'Erasmo, 2019), liquidity in repo and other financial markets (Van Horen and Kotidis, 2018;Boissay et al, 2018;Haselmann et al, 2019;Cenedese et al, 2019), cross-border spillovers (Franch et al, 2019;Takats and Temesvary, 2019), risk-taking (Martynova et al, 2019) and portfolio rebalancing away from risky (but potentially productive) lending towards safer assets (bonds or household mortgages) (Cohen and Scatigna, 2016;Ambrocio and Jokivuolle, 2017;Juelsrud and Wold, 2018;Gropp et al, 2019;Mayordomo and Rodriguez-Moreno, 2018), the non-price terms of credit contracts (Mayordomo et al, 2019), and shift in intermediation towards shadow banks (Irani et al, 2018). Gehrig and Iannino (2018) find evidence which suggests that the introduction of internal credit risk models in regulation may have led to increased exposures to systemic risk.…”