Cross Layer Attacks and How to Use Them (for DNS Cache Poisoning, Device Tracking and More)

Abstract

We analyze the prandom pseudo random number generator (PRNG) in use in the Linux kernel (which is the kernel of the Linux operating system, as well as of Android) and demonstrate that this PRNG is weak. The prandom PRNG is in use by many "consumers" in the Linux kernel. We focused on three consumers at the network level -the UDP source port generation algorithm, the IPv6 flow label generation algorithm and the IPv4 ID generation algorithm. The flawed prandom PRNG is shared by all these consumers, which enables us to mount "cross layer attacks" against the Linux kernel. In these attacks, we infer the internal state of the prandom PRNG from one OSI layer, and use it to either predict the values of the PRNG employed by the other OSI layer, or to correlate it to an internal state of the PRNG inferred from the other protocol.Using this approach we can mount a very efficient DNS cache poisoning attack against Linux. We collect TCP/IPv6 flow label values, or UDP source ports, or TCP/IPv4 IP ID values, reconstruct the internal PRNG state, then predict an outbound DNS query UDP source port, which speeds up the attack by a factor of x3000 to x6000. This attack works remotely, but can also be mounted locally, across Linux users and across containers, and (depending on the stub resolver) can poison the cache with an arbitrary DNS record. Additionally, we can identify and track Linux and Android devices -we collect TCP/IPv6 flow label values and/or UDP source port values and/or TCP/IPv4 ID fields, reconstruct the PRNG internal state and correlate this new state to previously extracted PRNG states to identify the same device.

An intelligent proactive defense against the client‐side DNS cache poisoning attack via self‐checking deep reinforcement learning

“…10 As a critical infrastructure, the DNS client security cannot be ignored. [11][12][13] However, a new DNS cache poisoning attack targeting it has occurred recently. 14 Unlike other threats, the attack targets DNS clients, which only need to cooperate with a nonprivileged malicious program.…”

“…As a critical infrastructure, the DNS client security cannot be ignored 11–13 . However, a new DNS cache poisoning attack targeting it has occurred recently 14 .…”

Enhancing security and privacy in VoIP/IMS environments

“…Various incidents based on this technique have been published [12,91,92]. The use of the Address Resolution Protocol [12] or Domain Name System [93] poisoning techniques enables the attacker to act as an intermediate. Particularly, the attacker changes the IP-MAC or the domain-IP associations correspondingly in order to redirect the traffic through him (acting as gateway) and gathers communication channel's data.…”

“…When (a) SIP Digest is employed, an attacker can act as an intermediate (MiM) between the P-CSCF and the UE, utilizing well-known attack techniques such as DNS [93,95] and ARP poisoning [12]. It is assumed that a legitimate UE has already established a multimedia conference room (i.e.…”