Cross-Layer Deanonymization Methods in the Lightning Protocol

Romiti, Matteo; Victor, Friedhelm; Moreno-Sanchez, Pedro; Nordholt, Peter Sebastian; Haslhofer, Bernhard; Maffei, Matteo

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-64322-8_9

Cited by 11 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Deanonymization: Deanonymization is generally named by Fröhlich et al [131] and others. Romiti et al [85] explain deanonymization by heuristics and linking algorithms, whereas Apostolaki et al [86] use perimeter by traffic interception. Ghesmati et al [87] describe the following deanonymization techniques that can be applied to the cryptocurrency Bitcoin: heuristics, side-channel attacks, flow analysis, and auxiliary information.…”

Section: Human Errors and Accidental Threatsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analyzing the Threats to Blockchain-Based Self-Sovereign Identities by Conducting a Literature Survey

Pöhn,

Grabatin,

Hommel

2023

Applied Sciences

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Self-sovereign identity (SSI) is a digital identity management model managed in a decentralized manner. It allows identity owners to manage and store their digital identities in a software wallet, for example, on a smartphone, without relying on centralized providers. This approach tries to enhance the security and privacy of digital identities and, thereby, their owners. With the new eIDAS regulation, elements of SSI, such as the wallet, are being pushed onto the market. However, since the model is relatively new, the security threats are still not fully known. This is shown by a brief security analysis of selected existing SSI wallets. In order to get a picture of the known threats, we systematically analyze and categorize related work in the field of SSI and elements applied by SSI. We then evaluate their application to current SSI systems and identify future work.

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Section: Human Errors and Accidental Threatsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analyzing the Threats to Blockchain-Based Self-Sovereign Identities by Conducting a Literature Survey

Pöhn,

Grabatin,

Hommel

2023

Applied Sciences

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“…Kappos et al use the same methodology to identify private channels (i.e., between two unknown LN nodes) [34]. These onchain transactions can further be used to cluster Bitcoin wallets and LN nodes into the same entity [60]. Aiming to learn the channel balances (e.g., that lead to large-scale payment deanonymization [34]), several probing attacks have been proposed.…”

Section: Privacy Attacks In the Lnmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revelio: A Network-Level Privacy Attack in the Lightning Network

von Arx,

Tran,

Vanbever

2023

2023 IEEE 8th European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)

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The Lightning Network (LN) is a widely-adopted off-chain protocol that not only addresses Bitcoin's scaling problem but also enables anonymous payments. Prior attacks have shown that an adversary controlling several peers at the central position of the network (e.g., by hijacking payment routes) can deanonymize such payments. However, these attacks are highly observable or require many parties to collude.This paper presents Revelio, a stealthier, passive network-level privacy attack against LN that exploits its joint centralization at the application and the network layers. Indeed, network-level adversaries can see most of the LN traffic (e.g., five autonomous systems can see up to 80 % of all observable communication channels) despite the encrypted communication between LN nodes and the widespread usage of Tor. This comprehensive view allows Revelio adversaries not only to estimate the payment amount but also to effectively reduce the anonymity size of its endpoints. We show that the Revelio attack is practical: it perfectly deanonymizes the senders or the receiver in almost one-third of tested payments in today's LN and underlying network topologies.

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Fundamental Properties of the Layer Below a Payment Channel Network

Grundmann

Hartenstein

2020

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Payment channel networks are a highly discussed approach for improving scalability of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. As they allow processing transactions off-chain, payment channel networks are referred to as second layer technology, while the blockchain is the first layer. We uncouple payment channel networks from blockchains and look at them as first-class citizens. This brings up the question what model payment channel networks require as first layer. In response, we formalize a model (called RFL model) for a first layer below a payment channel network. While transactions are globally made available by a blockchain, the RFL model only provides the reduced property that a transaction is delivered to the users being affected by a transaction. We show that the reduced model's properties still suffice to implement payment channels. By showing that the RFL model can not only be instantiated by the Bitcoin blockchain but also by trusted third parties like banks, we show that the reduction widens the design space for the first layer. Further, we show that the stronger property provided by blockchains allows for optimizations that can be used to reduce the time for locking collateral during payments over multiple hops in a payment channel network.

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Cross-Layer Deanonymization Methods in the Lightning Protocol

Cited by 11 publications

References 8 publications

Analyzing the Threats to Blockchain-Based Self-Sovereign Identities by Conducting a Literature Survey

Analyzing the Threats to Blockchain-Based Self-Sovereign Identities by Conducting a Literature Survey

Revelio: A Network-Level Privacy Attack in the Lightning Network

Fundamental Properties of the Layer Below a Payment Channel Network

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