Cross-path inference attacks on multipath TCP

Abstract

Multipath TCP (MPTCP) allows the concurrent use of multiple paths between two end points, and as such holds great promise for improving application performance. However, in this paper, we report a newly discovered class of attacks on MPTCP that may jeopardize and hamper its wide-scale adoption. The attacks stem from the interdependence between the multiple subflows in an MPTCP connection. MPTCP congestion control algorithms are designed to achieve resource pooling and fairness with single-path TCP users at shared bottlenecks. Therefore, multiple MPTCP subflows are inherently coupled with each other, resulting in potential side-channels that can be exploited to infer cross-path properties. In particular, an ISP monitoring one or more paths used by an MPTCP connection can infer sensitive and proprietary information (e.g., level of network congestion, endto-end TCP throughput, packet loss, network delay) about its competitors. Since the side-channel information enabled by the coupling among the subflows in an MPTCP connection results directly from the design goals of MPTCP congestion control algorithms, it is not obvious how to circumvent this attack easily. We believe our findings provide insights that can be used to guide future security-related research on MPTCP and other similar multipath extensions.

Mobility as a first class function

“…MP-TCP is backwards compatible with classic TCP. However, security issues remain [40] and a new a cross-path interference attack has been identified [41].…”

5G device-to-device communication security and multipath routing solutions

“…Use of mutipath routing for secure and reliable transmission of data has been extensively studied in the context of wireless sensor networks and multipath TCP (MPTCP) routing Munir et al 2017;Shafiq et al 2013). Multipath routing has been used for improving packet delivery ratios by distributing load more efficiently (Wang et al 2001;Ganjali and Keshavarzian 2004;Bhattacharya et al 2018;Pearlman et al 2000), improving energy usage efficiency (Ben-Othman and Yahya 2010; Velásquez-Villada and Donoso 2013), and dealing adaptively with congestion (Tran and Raghavendra 2005).…”

End-To-End Mobility for the Internet Using ILNP

“…The security risks are mostly from the arbitrary adding of subflows to the ongoing connection state, which could cause, for example, denial-ofservice and man-in-the-middle attacks. A new cross-path interference attack also has been identified [62]. This new attack allows people from one subflow to gain information (such as throughput, packet loss, and round trip time) of another subflow.…”