Cross-Species Affective Neuroscience Decoding of the Primal Affective Experiences of Humans and Related Animals

Abstract

BackgroundThe issue of whether other animals have internally felt experiences has vexed animal behavioral science since its inception. Although most investigators remain agnostic on such contentious issues, there is now abundant experimental evidence indicating that all mammals have negatively and positively-valenced emotional networks concentrated in homologous brain regions that mediate affective experiences when animals are emotionally aroused. That is what the neuroscientific evidence indicates.Principal FindingsThe relevant lines of evidence are as follows: 1) It is easy to elicit powerful unconditioned emotional responses using localized electrical stimulation of the brain (ESB); these effects are concentrated in ancient subcortical brain regions. Seven types of emotional arousals have been described; using a special capitalized nomenclature for such primary process emotional systems, they are SEEKING, RAGE, FEAR, LUST, CARE, PANIC/GRIEF and PLAY. 2) These brain circuits are situated in homologous subcortical brain regions in all vertebrates tested. Thus, if one activates FEAR arousal circuits in rats, cats or primates, all exhibit similar fear responses. 3) All primary-process emotional-instinctual urges, even ones as complex as social PLAY, remain intact after radical neo-decortication early in life; thus, the neocortex is not essential for the generation of primary-process emotionality. 4) Using diverse measures, one can demonstrate that animals like and dislike ESB of brain regions that evoke unconditioned instinctual emotional behaviors: Such ESBs can serve as ‘rewards’ and ‘punishments’ in diverse approach and escape/avoidance learning tasks. 5) Comparable ESB of human brains yield comparable affective experiences. Thus, robust evidence indicates that raw primary-process (i.e., instinctual, unconditioned) emotional behaviors and feelings emanate from homologous brain functions in all mammals (see Appendix S1), which are regulated by higher brain regions. Such findings suggest nested-hierarchies of BrainMind affective processing, with primal emotional functions being foundational for secondary-process learning and memory mechanisms, which interface with tertiary-process cognitive-thoughtful functions of the BrainMind.

Prospective organization of neonatal arm movements: A motor foundation of embodied agency, disrupted in premature birth

“…This system of prospectively organized action units is comparable to the notion of a primary sensorimotor intentionality, or intentions in action , that are organized by their motor goal (Delafield‐Butt & Gangopadhyay, 2013; Searle, 1980, 1983). This philosophical notion agrees with Panksepp's identification—developed through comparative neurophysiological work across the vertebrates—of a primary self that expresses its agency in movement (Panksepp, 2011; Panksepp & Biven, 2012). These basic intentions in action, or intention‐actions as Searle names them, are self‐generated future‐oriented movements whose organization is determined by an anticipation of their future effect.…”

Neuroimaging Helps to Clarify Brain Affective Processing Without Necessarily Clarifying Emotions

“…If we consider that primary-process analysis, best pursued in animal models (Panksepp, 1998(Panksepp, , 2011a, provides the most robust evidence for cross-mammalian genetically-ingrained infrastructures for emotionality, not only in terms of behavior but raw phenomenally significant affective experiences, we may need to cultivate new ways to discuss the full complexity of the brain and mind (Solms & Panksepp, 2012). The single fact that highlights the affective phenomenology that arises from these ancient circuits is the simple fact that wherever in the brain investigators have evoked, with deep brain stimulation, coherent instinctual expressions of emotional behaviors, those central states always serve as rewards and punishments in the control of simple learned approach and escape behaviors (even in the absence of neocortex).…”

“…The present multi-tiered evolutionary model that we propose here may help to guide scientific inquiries and explain scientific findings in more coherent, and hopefully understandable ways. It must be noted that most other animals do not have such massive higher reflections of cognitively experienced affective processing, so in them instinctual emotional behaviours may veridically reflect corresponding affective states (Panksepp, 1998(Panksepp, , 2011a. Thus, animal research may help illuminate the subcortical emotional and affective infrastructures of human minds that are comparatively inaccessible through human research.…”

Reflections on a footnote: implications for the study of emotions in animals

“…Indeed, by taking these affective systems seriously, we may be heading toward more precise animal models of psychiatric disorders. (Panksepp, 2011b(Panksepp, , p. 1798 According to Panksepp (2010Panksepp ( , 2011aPanksepp ( ,b, 2012, the primary process affective mind arose earlier in evolution than our sophisticated cognitive minds, and mammals share this basic process involving sensory, homeostatic 8 Interested readers can access the topics that are being discussed in ISN's meetings on the site http://psfebus.allenpress.com/eBusISNE/ HOME.aspx 9 The interested reader can access the topics that are being discussed in the meetings of IBNS on the site http://www.ibnsconnect.org/.…”