Cryptanalysis and Improvement of Mutual Authentication Protocol for EPC C1G2 passive RFID Tag

Abstract

A Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system is a contactless automatic identification system that uses small and low-cost tags. The restricted computation ability and limited memory capacity of low-cost tags make existing RFID systems vulnerable. EPC Class 1 Generation 2 (EPC-C1G2) is the most popular standard for low cost passive RFID tags, for improving security of this standard; many security schemes are designed since the release of the EPC-C1G2. In 2013 Pang et al.'s, proposed an improved authentication protocol for low cost RFID systems. They claimed that this protocol is secure against various attacks. In this paper, we show that this protocol is still vulnerable against other attacks which didn't discussed by Bezhad et al. Then, an improved protocol is proposed to fix the vulnerabilities, moreover we show that the proposed protocol is conforms to EPC-C1G2.