2015 International Conference on Military Communications and Information Systems (ICMCIS) 2015
DOI: 10.1109/icmcis.2015.7158683
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Cryptanalysis of alternating step generators

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“…More effective countermeasures are usually accomplished by applying some pseudorandom bit obfuscation to the real challenges such that a good quality binary classifier cannot be built. Unfortunately, most of these nonlinear transformations, such as SHA-256 hash function [116], Geffe generator [117], non-linear feedback shift registers [118], alternating step generators [119], etc., require a lot more hardware resources than the implementation of the A-PUF itself.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…More effective countermeasures are usually accomplished by applying some pseudorandom bit obfuscation to the real challenges such that a good quality binary classifier cannot be built. Unfortunately, most of these nonlinear transformations, such as SHA-256 hash function [116], Geffe generator [117], non-linear feedback shift registers [118], alternating step generators [119], etc., require a lot more hardware resources than the implementation of the A-PUF itself.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%