Cryptanalysis of Álvarez et al. key exchange scheme

Kamal, Abdel Alim; Youssef, Amr M.

doi:10.1016/j.ins.2012.10.010

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…The method we used is linearity similar to that in Refs. [6,9,14]. The attack only needs to solve computational SEME problem instead of SEME problem or discrete logarithm problem.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[7,8] are the companion matrices of primitive polynomials over F p . Kamal and Youssef [9] showed that breaking the key exchange scheme of Ref. [8] with security parameters (r, s, p) is equivalent to solving a set of 3(r +s) 2 linear equations with 2(r + s) 2 unknowns in F p , which renders this system insecure for all the suggested practical choices of the security parameters.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Cryptanalysis of an Encryption Scheme Using Matrices over Finite Fields

Huang¹,

Deng²,

et al. 2018

Chin. j. electron.

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“…The method we used is linearity similar to that in Refs. [6,9,14]. The attack only needs to solve computational SEME problem instead of SEME problem or discrete logarithm problem.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cryptanalysis of an Encryption Scheme Using Matrices over Finite Fields

Huang¹,

Deng²,

et al. 2018

Chin. j. electron.

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“…A second way to attack the present protocol would be to find a polynomial time algorithm to solve the algebraic generalized symmetric decomposition. As some simpler OWTF based on algebraic conjugation were successfully cryptanalyzed [38,39], it was mandatory to find very hard functions. We presented earlier (see Definition (5)) a stronger version, the blind general symmetric decomposition problem (BGSDP).…”

Section: Protocol Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Post-Quantum Cryptography: generalized ElGamal cipher over GF(251^8)

Hecht

2017

TAAI

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Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) attempts to find cryptographic protocols resistant to attacks by means of for instance Shor's polynomial time algorithm for numerical field problems like integer factorization (IFP) or the discrete logarithm (DLP). Other aspects are the backdoors discovered in deterministic random generators or recent advances in solving some instances of DLP. The use of alternative algebraic structures like non-commutative or non-associative partial groupoids, magmas, monoids, semigroups, quasigroups or groups, are valid choices for these new kinds of protocols. In this paper, we focus in an asymmetric cipher based on a generalized ElGamal non-arbitrated protocol using a non-commutative general linear group. The developed protocol forces a hard subgroup membership search problem into a non-commutative structure. The protocol involves at first a generalized Diffie-Hellman key interchange and further on the private and public parameters are recursively updated each time a new cipher session is launched. Security is based on a hard variation of the Generalized Symmetric Decomposition Problem (GSDP). Working with GF (251 8 ) a 64-bits security is achieved, and if GF ( 251 16 ) is chosen, the security rises to 127-bits. An appealing feature is that there is no need for big number libraries as all arithmetic if performed in Z 251 and therefore the new protocol is particularly useful for computational platforms with very limited capabilities like smartphones or smartcards.

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Cryptanalysis of Álvarez et al. key exchange scheme

Cited by 2 publications

References 12 publications

Cryptanalysis of an Encryption Scheme Using Matrices over Finite Fields

Cryptanalysis of an Encryption Scheme Using Matrices over Finite Fields

Post-Quantum Cryptography: generalized ElGamal cipher over GF(251^8)

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