2017
DOI: 10.3233/jcs-16863
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Cryptographic enforcement of information flow policies without public information via tree partitions1

Abstract: We may enforce an information flow policy by encrypting a protected resource and ensuring that only users authorized by the policy are able to decrypt the resource. In most schemes in the literature that use symmetric cryptographic primitives, each user is assigned a single secret and derives decryption keys using this secret and publicly available information. Recent work has challenged this approach by developing schemes, based on a chain partition of the information flow policy, that do not require public i… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…An assignment scheme with a hierarchical key was recently proposed [14]. Contrasting with some established schemes that generally encloses a single secret key and few public information to process the decryption process, the proposed system did not share any public information as it is based on access policy chain partitions.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An assignment scheme with a hierarchical key was recently proposed [14]. Contrasting with some established schemes that generally encloses a single secret key and few public information to process the decryption process, the proposed system did not share any public information as it is based on access policy chain partitions.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As a result, we can reduce the size of the encrypted information on the edges and only store them for any node v i such that there exists an edge (v i , v j ) ∈ E and v i is not the parent of v j and as such cannot deterministically derive the secret value S j by starting from its own secret value S i . With this optimization in place, our scheme is comparable to a tree-based hierarchical key assignment scheme [8] where we store the additional derivation keys as encrypted information on the edges instead of storing them as secrets within each node that requires them. Finally, if the key generation and derivation processes happen on the fly (i.e., when the entire process starts from the seed), then the only private storage required is proportional to the length of the initial seed S −1 , i.e., to the length of the security parameter λ.…”
Section: For Each Vertexmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Another piece of work using a hierarchical key assignment scheme is recently proposed [7]. Unlike other relevant schemes that need a single secret and some public information to derive decryption keys, this system does not require publishing any public information for the key derivation operation in the lower down classes because it is based on the concept of chain partitions of the access policy.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%