2006
DOI: 10.1109/jproc.2005.862423
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Cryptographic Processors-A Survey

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
78
0
3

Year Published

2007
2007
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
6
3

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 150 publications
(81 citation statements)
references
References 30 publications
0
78
0
3
Order By: Relevance
“…A number of documented attacks exhibit major flaws in the PIN processing API of HSMs [2,8,10,18]. For example, the so-called PIN format attack recovers the PIN by inducing errors in the integrity check of the reformatting step.…”
Section: The Pin Integrity Check Protocolmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A number of documented attacks exhibit major flaws in the PIN processing API of HSMs [2,8,10,18]. For example, the so-called PIN format attack recovers the PIN by inducing errors in the integrity check of the reformatting step.…”
Section: The Pin Integrity Check Protocolmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A wide variety of hardware devices have been designed to provide a physical environment in which sensitive code can be executed without being observed or modified [6]. These kinds of devices are frequently used to implement digital rights management systems in consumer electronics devices, such as mobile phones and DVD players, and may have their security properties specified by the standards body responsible for the digital rights management system.…”
Section: Tamper-resistant Hardwarementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Note that the nonce does not provide additional security since replay attacks are not an issue. 4 The client invokes the TPM CreateWrapKey command (3) to have the TPM create a non-migratable asymmetric encryption key (4) that is sealed to the PCRs specified in step 2 (5). The client loads the key into the TPM by invoking TPM LoadKey2 (6), receives the key handle from the TPM (7), and has the TPM certify the loaded key with the AIK (8).…”
Section: −1mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It represents the views of the authors. 1 There seems to be consensus in the information-security community that TCBs for trusted computing must be hardware-based, but tamper-proof hardware remains an open challenge [4,5]. 2 http://www.emscb.de/ and http://www.opentc.net/.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%