Cryptographic puzzles and distance-bounding protocols: Practical tools for RFID security

Peris-López, Pedro; Hernández-Castro, Julio; Tapiador, Juan E.; Palomar, Esther; Lubbe, J.C.A. van der

doi:10.1109/rfid.2010.5467258

Cited by 26 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…A number of distance bounding protocols were proposed in recent years [2], [4], [5], [12], [14], [15], [19]- [21], [23], [24], [27]- [29]. The proposed protocols differ in terms of the performance and security guarantees that they provide.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distance Hijacking Attacks on Distance Bounding Protocols

Cremers

Rasmussen

Schmidt

et al. 2012

2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

124

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After several years of theoretical research on distance bounding protocols, the first implementations of such protocols have recently started to appear. These protocols are typically analyzed with respect to three types of attacks, which are historically known as Distance Fraud, Mafia Fraud, and Terrorist Fraud.We define and analyze a fourth main type of attack on distance bounding protocols, called Distance Hijacking. This type of attack poses a serious threat in many practical scenarios. We show that many proposed distance bounding protocols are vulnerable to Distance Hijacking, and we propose solutions to make these protocols resilient to this type of attack.We show that verifying distance bounding protocols using existing informal and formal frameworks does not guarantee the absence of Distance Hijacking attacks. We extend a formal framework for reasoning about distance bounding protocols to include overshadowing attacks. We use the resulting framework to prove the absence of all of the found attacks for protocols to which our countermeasures have been applied.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distance Hijacking Attacks on Distance Bounding Protocols

Cremers

Rasmussen

Schmidt

et al. 2012

2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

124

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show abstract

“…There are four direct descendants of Brands and Chaum's protocol: [20,42,59,63], each of which improved Brands and Chaum in its own way. Peris-Lopez et al [59] propose that cryptographic puzzles should be used to provide privacy in distance-bounding protocols. Rasmussen andČapkun protocol [63] is based on XOR and a comparison function, and has the benefit that the prover does not need to demodulate the signal to answer to the verifier's challenges.…”

Section: Protocol Evolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security of Distance-Bounding

et al. 2018

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Distance-bounding protocols allow a verifier to both authenticate a prover and evaluate whether the latter is located in his vicinity. These protocols are of particular interest in contactless systems, e.g., electronic payment or access control systems, which are vulnerable to distance-based frauds. This survey analyzes and compares in a unified manner many existing distance-bounding protocols with respect to several key security and complexity features.

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“…A preliminary version of our protocol can be found in [66]. In this article, the protocol specification is enhanced and further analyzed in terms of the computational overheads and security properties achieved.…”

Section: Distance-bounding Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A secure distance-based RFID identification protocol with an off-line back-end database

Peris-López

Orfila

Palomar

et al. 2011

Pers Ubiquit Comput

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The design of a secure RFID identification scheme is a thought-provoking challenge, and this paper deals with this problem adopting a groundbreaking approach. The proposed protocol, called Noent, is based on cryptographic puzzles to avoid the indiscriminate disclose of the confidential information stored on tags and on an innovative role reversal distance-bounding protocol to distinguish between honest and rogue readers. The protocol provides moderate privacy protection (data and location) to single tags but its effectiveness increases hugely when it is used to protect a large population of tags (e.g., protection against inventory disclosure). Moreover, in comparison with classical approaches, Noent does not require an online database, which facilitates key updating and mitigates desynchronization attacks.

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Cryptographic puzzles and distance-bounding protocols: Practical tools for RFID security

Cited by 26 publications

References 15 publications

Distance Hijacking Attacks on Distance Bounding Protocols

Distance Hijacking Attacks on Distance Bounding Protocols

Security of Distance-Bounding

A secure distance-based RFID identification protocol with an off-line back-end database

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