Cryptographic Secrecy Analysis of Adaptive Steganographic Syndrome-Trellis Codes

Abstract

Compared with traditional steganography, adaptive steganography based on STC (Syndrome-Trellis Codes) has extremely high antidetection ability and has been a mainstream and hot research direction in the field of information hiding over the past decades. However, it is noted, in specific scenarios, that a small number of methods can extract data from STC-based adaptive steganography, indicating security risks related to such algorithms. In this manuscript, the cryptographic secrecy of this kind of steganography is analyzed, on condition of two common attacks: stego-only attack and known-cover attack, respectively, from three perspectives: steganographic key equivocation, message equivocation, and unicity distance of the steganographic key. Focusing on the special layout characteristics of the parity-check matrix of STC, under the two attack conditions, the theoretical boundaries of the steganographic key equivocation function, the message equivocation function, and the unicity distance of the steganographic key are separately obtained, showing the impact of the three elements: the submatrix size, the randomness of the data, and the cover object on the cryptographic secrecy of the STC-based adaptive steganography, resulting in a theoretical reference to accurately judge the cryptographic secrecy of such steganography and design more secure steganography methods.