Cryptographic security of quantum key distribution

Portmann, Christopher; Renner, Renato

doi:10.48550/arxiv.1409.3525

Cited by 50 publications

(122 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…In heuristic approach the NS norm is a maximal guessing advantage for a distinguisher to distinguish between two devices and plays a role of a composable distance [49,62]:…”

Section: Features Of the Ns Normmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Equivalence of the complete-extension based security definition with the ensembles-based one: We show that in the NSDI scenario, in analogy to quantum cryptography [49,50], there exist two different, however equivalent definitions of security. One connected to the notion of the so-called distinguisher and the other one based on the proximity in norm [51,52].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our definition of NS norm security criterion, is equivalent to the criteria used by Renner, Hänggi and Wolf [17], is much more prominent from the following Theorem, where we develop an analogy to the results of Refs. [49,50], but for non-signaling devices:…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Following arguments in Ref. [49], and from the above Theorem, we can claim that our definition of security is restricted composable [51][52][53] provided the device is not reused. In that sense, our definition diverges from that of [17] formally in two ways.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Limitations on device independent key secure against non signaling adversary via the squashed non-locality

Winczewski¹,

Das²,

Horodecki³

2019

Preprint

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We initiate a systematic study to provide upper bounds on device-independent key, secure against a non-signaling adversary (NSDI), distilled by a wide class of operations, currently used in both quantum and non-signaling device-independent protocols. These operations consist of a direct measurements on the devices followed by Local Operations and Public Communication (MDLOPC). We employ the idea of "squashing" on the secrecy monotones, which provide upper bounds on the key rate in secret key agreement (SKA) scenario, and show that squashed secrecy monotones are the upper bounds on NSDI key. As an important instance, an upper bound on NSDI key rate called "squashed non-locality", has been constructed. It exhibits several important properties, including convexity, monotonicity, additivity on tensor products, and asymptotic continuity. Using this bound, we identify numerically a domain of two binary inputs and two binary outputs non-local devices for which the squashed non-locality is zero, and therefore one can not distill key from them via MDLOPC operations. These are mixtures of Popescu-Rohrlich (PR) and anti-PR box with the weight of PR box less than 80%. This example confirms the intuition that non-locality need not imply secrecy in the non-signaling scenario. The approach is general, describing how to construct other tighter yet possibly less computable upper bounds. Our technique for obtaining upper bounds is based on the non-signaling analog of quantum purification: the complete extension. This extension provides the ultimate eavesdropping power with the minimal consumption of eavesdropper's memory and, as we prove, yields equivalent security conditions as previously known in the literature.

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“…In heuristic approach the NS norm is a maximal guessing advantage for a distinguisher to distinguish between two devices and plays a role of a composable distance [49,62]:…”

Section: Features Of the Ns Normmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Limitations on device independent key secure against non signaling adversary via the squashed non-locality

Winczewski¹,

Das²,

Horodecki³

2019

Preprint

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“…However, this is not the case for stand-alone security notions that are common in cryptography. To illustrate such failures of composability, let us consider the history of quantum key distribution (QKD), as recounted in [70]: QKD was originally proposed in 80s [8]. The first security proofs against unbounded adversaries followed a decade later [9,58,59,75].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Categorical composable cryptography

Broadbent,

Karvonen

2021

Preprint

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We formalize the simulation paradigm of cryptography in terms of category theory and show that protocols secure against abstract attacks form a symmetric monoidal category, thus giving an abstract model of composable security definitions in cryptography. Our model is able to incorporate computational security, set-up assumptions and various attack models such as colluding or independently acting subsets of adversaries in a modular, flexible fashion. We conclude by using string diagrams to rederive no-go results concerning the limits of bipartite and tripartite cryptography, ruling out e.g. composable commitments and broadcasting. On the way, we exhibit two categorical constructions of resource theories that might be of independent interest: one capturing resources shared among n parties and one capturing resource conversions that succeed asymptotically.

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Continuous‐Variable Quantum Key Distribution with Gaussian Modulation—The Theory of Practical Implementations

et al. 2018

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) using weak coherent states and homodyne detection is a promising candidate for practical quantum‐cryptographic implementations due to its compatibility with existing telecom equipment and high detection efficiencies. However, despite the actual simplicity of the protocol, the security analysis of this method is rather involved compared to discrete‐variable QKD. This article reviews the theoretical foundations of continuous‐variable quantum key distribution (CV‐QKD) with Gaussian modulation and rederives the essential relations from scratch in a pedagogical way. The aim of this paper is to be as comprehensive and self‐contained as possible in order to be well intelligible even for readers with little pre‐knowledge on the subject. Although the present article is a theoretical discussion of CV‐QKD, its focus lies on practical implementations, taking into account various kinds of hardware imperfections and suggesting practical methods to perform the security analysis subsequent to the key exchange. Apart from a review of well‐known results, this manuscript presents a set of new original noise models which are helpful to get an estimate of how well a given set of hardware will perform in practice.

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Cryptographic security of quantum key distribution

Cited by 50 publications

References 14 publications

Limitations on device independent key secure against non signaling adversary via the squashed non-locality

Limitations on device independent key secure against non signaling adversary via the squashed non-locality

Categorical composable cryptography

Continuous‐Variable Quantum Key Distribution with Gaussian Modulation—The Theory of Practical Implementations

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