Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information

Kol, Gillat; Naor, Moni

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-78524-8_18

Cited by 137 publications

(131 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…To eliminate the on-line dealer, several schemes rely on multiple invocations of protocols for generic secure multi-party computation [11,24,1,18,4]. It is unclear whether computationally efficient protocols with suitable functionality can be designed.…”

Section: Computational Inefficiencymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Kol and Naor [18] show how to avoid simultaneous broadcast, at the cost of increasing the round complexity by a (multiplicative) factor linear in the size of the domain from which the secret is chosen; this approach cannot (efficiently) handle secrets of super-logarithmic length. Subsequent work by Kol and Naor [19] (see also [4]) shows how to avoid the assumption of simultaneous broadcast at the expense of increasing the round complexity by a (multiplicative) factor of t. We provide a detailed comparison of our results to those of [19] in Section 1.3.…”

Section: Strong Communication Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We follow the same high-level approach as in [13,11,24,1,18,19,4]. Our reconstruction protocol proceeds in a sequence of "fake" iterations followed by a single "real" iteration.…”

Section: Overview Of Our Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several works [13,11,24,1,18,19,27,26,4] have focused on designing rational secret-sharing protocols immune to the above problem. Protocols for rational secret sharing also follow from the more general results of Lepinski et al [20,21,15,14].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Efficient Rational Secret Sharing in Standard Communication Networks

Fuchsbauer

Katz

Naccache

2010

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

103

189

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Abstract. We propose a new methodology for rational secret sharing leading to various instantiations (in both the two-party and multi-party settings) that are simple and efficient in terms of computation, share size, and round complexity. Our protocols do not require physical assumptions or simultaneous channels, and can even be run over asynchronous, pointto-point networks.We also propose new equilibrium notions (namely, computational versions of strict Nash equilibrium and stability with respect to trembles) and prove that our protocols satisfy them. These notions guarantee, roughly speaking, that at each point in the protocol there is a unique legal message a party can send. This, in turn, ensures that protocol messages cannot be used as subliminal channels, something achieved in prior work only by making strong assumptions on the communication network.

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Section: Computational Inefficiencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Strong Communication Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We follow the same high-level approach as in [13,11,24,1,18,19,4]. Our reconstruction protocol proceeds in a sequence of "fake" iterations followed by a single "real" iteration.…”

Section: Overview Of Our Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Efficient Rational Secret Sharing in Standard Communication Networks

Fuchsbauer

Katz

Naccache

2010

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

103

189

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“…Several protocols have been devised to solve this problem [5,4,1,10,9,8,7,6,11,13,2,3], but only a handful have actually dealt with rational secret sharing using an asynchronous broadcast channel. These include Maleka et al's result [10] and Fuchsbauer et al's result [3], and Ong et al's result [13].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rational Secret Sharing with Honest Players over an Asynchronous Channel

Moses

Rangan

2011

Advances in Network Security and Applications

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We consider the problem of rational secret sharing introduced by Halpern and Teague [5], where the players involved in secret sharing play only if it is to their advantage. This can be characterized in the form of preferences. Players would prefer to get the secret than to not get it and secondly with lesser preference, they would like as few other players to get the secret as possible. Several positive results have already been published to efficiently solve the problem of rational secret sharing. However, only a handful of papers have touched upon the use of an asynchronous broadcast channel, and in those papers, either the protocol involved cryptographic primitives [3] or else the protocol required the dealer to be interactively involved [10]. However, [13] did handle such a case through the use of an honest minority of players, but in their paper, they had placed a restriction on the number of honest players that could take part in relation to the total number number of players active in the protocol.In our paper, we propose an m-out-of-n rational secret sharing scheme which can function over an asynchronous broadcast channel without the use of cryptographic primitives and with a non-interactive dealer. This is possible because our scheme uses a small number, k + 1, of honest players. The protocol is resilient to coalitions of size up to k and furthermore it is ε-resilient to coalitions of size up to m − 1. The protocol will have a strict Nash equilibrium with probability P r( k+1 n ) and an ε-Nash equilibrium with probability P r( n−k−1 n ). Furthermore, our protocol is immune to backward induction.Later on in the paper, we extend our results to include malicious players as well. We also show that our protocol handles the possibility of a player deviating in order to force another player to get a wrong value. This type of deviation was discussed and handled by Asharov and Lindell [2] by increasing the number of rounds. However, our protocol handles this in what we believe to be a more time efficient manner.

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Social rational secure multi‐party computation

Wang

Liu

Wang

et al. 2013

Concurrency and Computation

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SUMMARYRational party is a new kind of parties who behave neither like honest parties nor like malicious adversaries. The crux point of rational party is the definition of the utility function, as rational parties only care about how to maximize their utility. In other words, rational parties choose the strategies, which can bring them the highest utilities. In rational secure two‐party computation protocol, the main task is how to boost mutual cooperation to complete the protocol. Social rational secure multi‐party computation (SRSMPC) means that in a social network, some distributed and rational parties with reputation properties want to jointly compute a functionality. The seemingly simple task becomes tough under three conditions. The first condition is that the network composed by parties may not be complete. That is, two parties may not be neighbors and they are connected through other parties. The second is that the network may be not secure. That is, messages may be tempered by malicious parties. The third condition is that parties may run the protocol under incomplete information scenario. That is, parties may have types and each type has a corresponding utility function. Under the first and second conditions, parties need to consider how to securely transmit messages between two parties who are not neighbors. Under the third condition, we propose the Tit‐for‐Tat strategy and prove that mutual cooperation is a sequential equilibrium between two parties. In this paper, we construct an SRSMPC protocol by using mechanism design under incomplete information to facilitate the implementation of the SRSMPC protocol within constant rounds. Meanwhile, newcomers are allowed to participate in the protocol. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first social rational secure computation protocol for multi‐party under an incomplete information scenario and an incomplete network. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information

Cited by 137 publications

References 32 publications

Efficient Rational Secret Sharing in Standard Communication Networks

Efficient Rational Secret Sharing in Standard Communication Networks

Rational Secret Sharing with Honest Players over an Asynchronous Channel

Social rational secure multi‐party computation

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