Cues to Coup Plotters

Abstract

A large proportion of coup attempts in autocracies occur in the aftermath of elections, yet little systematic research exists on the topic. Drawing on recent literature on elections in autocracies, we present an argument to explain postelection coups. While we recognize that electoral institutions have the potential to stabilize autocracies, we illustrate that the election event can spark instability when incumbents reveal electoral weakness. Electoral outcomes-in the form of vote shares and opposition reactions-are signals containing information about the strength of the opposition, and indirectly about the likelihood of a successful full-scale revolution that would compromise the privileged positions of regime elites. In these situations, coups are likely to be initiated to avoid a revolution, either by serving as concessions to the opposition or by facilitating increased repression. We perform a large-N study that supports our argument, significantly nuancing the claim that elections stabilize autocracies.

Coup d’État and Democracy

“…This argument, derived largely from Luttwak’s (1969) “handbook” on coup d’état, links coup to economic performance via public opinion. Coups are more likely to succeed when the public will accept the new regime and acceptance is more easily achieved when the public lacks strong allegiance to the ousted incumbent (Casper & Tyson, 2014; Galetovic & Sanhueza, 2000; Wig & Rod, 2014). Many have used an identical logic to claim democratically elected leaders should be less vulnerable to coups because they are perceived to be more legitimate than non-democratic leaders (Finer, 1988; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982; Lindberg & Clark, 2008; Luttwak, 1969).…”

“…Statistical analyses of the historical record do not bring much clarity to the democracy–coup relationship. Much of the literature treats coup as a problem for dictators and studies coup in the context of non-democratic states (Bove & Rivera, 2015; Svolik, 2009, 2012; Wig & Rod, 2014), and the cross-national quantitative literature on democracy and coup has yet to reach any consensus. Lindberg and Clark (2008) examine Africa from 1990 to 2004 and argue democracies face a lower risk of suffering a coup attempt, but their analysis includes no control variables for other plausible explanations for this correlation, including disparate levels of economic development and political stability.…”

Subnational Elections and Media Freedom in Autocracies: Diffusion of Local Reputation and Regime Survival

“…The incumbent’s fraudulent behavior to win in an election can serve as a focal point that facilitates mass mobilization against the government, which eventually increases the likelihood of regime breakdown (Kuntz and Thompson, 2009; Tucker, 2007). Holding elections also can undermine autocratic regime coherence within ruling cliques because an election result provides would-be coup plotters with information about whether the incumbent can be removed without provoking public unrest (Wig and Rød, 2016). Knutsen, Nygård, and Wig (2017), on the other hand, provide a mixed argument that although elections can enhance autocratic survival in the long run, they can also be detrimental to regime survival since elections serve as focal points, reducing collective action problems among opposition groups.…”

To Purge or Not to Purge? An Individual-Level Quantitative Analysis of Elite Purges in Dictatorships

“…If dictators execute a first-generation elite, the elite's ability to threaten the regime has been eliminated and this performative act sends a warning to other elites who may consider plotting against the leader (Easton and Siverson 2018b). However, executing first-generation elites risks confirming other elites' concerns about the dictator's disregard for the implications of power sharing and raises the question of whether any of them are safe from violence (relatedly, see Magaloni 2008, 724; Wig and Rød 2016, 793). Seeking to avoid a similar fate as executed elites, others may plot pre-emptive coup or assassination attempts (Sudduth 2017).…”