Cultural Pluralism: A Response to Seglow's Critique

Abstract

I examine Seglow's critique (Politics 17(3) 1997) of my assessment of Parekh's theory of operative public values (Politics 16(3) 1996). This examination has four main stages: (a) the rejection of crucial aspects of Seglow's interpretation of my argument, (b) the rejection of his claim that my argument is logically committed to certain other specific positions which I do not support, (c) the rejection of his claim that I my argumentative strategies are misleading, (d) the consideration of possible similarities and disagreements between our respective positive positions on cultural pluralism.

Without Blinders: Public Values Scholarship in Political Science, Economics, and Law—Content and Contribution to Public Administration

“…In addition, Seglow (1997) and Tyler (1996) reinforce the thought that OPVs ignore the possibility of values changing over time for reasons other than people belonging to culturally pluralistic societies (De Tombe, 2001;Tyler, 1998). While they propose that cultural pluralism cannot be sacrificed for the tenets of liberal democracy, Tyler (1998) reasons that liberal WITHOUT BLINDERS democracies could be reformed to accommodate the legitimate demands of diverse groups, and the notion of OPVs is inadequate and contradictory in this context.…”

“…While they propose that cultural pluralism cannot be sacrificed for the tenets of liberal democracy, Tyler (1998) reasons that liberal WITHOUT BLINDERS democracies could be reformed to accommodate the legitimate demands of diverse groups, and the notion of OPVs is inadequate and contradictory in this context.…”